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Abstract  
Flexible Alternating Current Transmission Systems (FACTS) devices are installed on electric 
power transmission lines to stabilize and regulate power flow. Power lines protected by 
FACTS devices can increase power flow and better respond to contingencies. The University 
of Missouri Rolla (UMR) is currently working on a multi-year project to examine the 
potential use of multiple FACTS devices distributed over a large power system region in a 
cooperative arrangement in which the FACTS devices work together to optimize and 
stabilize the regional power system. The report describes operational and security challenges 
that need to be addressed to employ FACTS devices in this way and recommends references, 
processes, technologies, and policies to address these challenges. 
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1 Introduction 
Flexible Alternating Current Transmission Systems (FACTS) devices are installed on electric 
power transmission lines to stabilize and regulate power flow. Power lines protected by 
FACTS devices can support greater current because anomalies—frequency excursions, 
voltage drop, phase mismatch, malformed wave shape, power spikes, etc.—that would 
otherwise cause breakers to trip are removed or greatly reduced by FACTS conditioning. 
A FACTS device can also limit the amount of current that flows on a line by effectively 
increasing the line’s impedance. This enables a much greater degree of flow control than 
provided by a switch or breaker. In particular, when current applied to a FACTS-protected 
line is greater than the device will allow, the power merely flows elsewhere rather than 
tripping a breaker, and power continues to flow on the protected line. 
Essentially, lines can be run closer to their theoretical capacities when they are protected by 
FACTS devices. For a large line, that can mean substantial additional power. High-voltage, 
high-power FACTS devices are building-sized and expensive, but they are lower cost and 
have less impact per added unit of electric power than new transmission lines. This is the 
essential benefit of operating standalone FACTS devices on individual lines. 
FACTS devices offer an additional benefit: consider an interconnected network where two 
identical lines are carrying power, one at 50% of its capacity1, the other at 99%. Assume that 
any additional load will be supplied equally through the two lines and that there is sufficient 
generating capacity to support the additional load being considered. Under these conditions, 
additional load can be supplied only up to the limit of either line, and since one is at 99%, the 
system can support only about twice the remaining 1% (half of the additional power would 
go to each line). Additional power would cause the 99% line’s protective breakers to trip, at 
which point all power would attempt to pass through the remaining line, which would then 
also trip; the generators, being disconnected from their loads, would shut down, and the 
system would go dark. 
However, if the line at 99% were held there by a FACTS device, any added power would go 
through the 50% line while power continued to flow in the 99% line at its original level. The 
capacity of this network considered as a whole would be increased by 25%, over and above 
the stabilizing and regulating benefits provided by the FACTS device. Note that this benefit 
cannot be recognized by analyzing just the FACTS device and its assigned branch, but only 
by considering the entire network. For a system that often operates in this sort of unbalanced 
state, FACTS devices can provide substantial additional capacity simply by forcing more of 
the network to carry the level of power it was designed to carry.  
                                                
1 For this example assume that capacity refers to the line’s operational limit under local conditions. 
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This idea leads to a new mode of operation: FACTS Devices can also direct power to less-
utilized parts of the transmission network, effectively increasing the capacity of the network, 
in addition to their customary standalone roles. Because optimum flow for the network as a 
whole cannot be achieved by considering only single branches, FACTS devices can perform 
this function only in cooperation with one another. In this report such devices are referred to 
as Cooperating FACTS devices, or CFDs. 
In practice, however, the additional communication required of CFDs opens the potential for 
subverting the operation of a cooperative system. This report considers both the operational 
and security aspects of CFDs operating in an electric power system network. 
Sections 2 through 7 of this report address the operation of a CFD system2: 
• Discussion of the operation of an electric power network (Section 2). 
• Description of the elements of a system of CFDs, including existing standalone FACTS 
device types and their function and operation and the hardware, software and algorithms 
needed to carry out CFD functions (Section 3). 
• Description and discussion of the relationships among the various control and data 
information flows in a CFD system and discussion of particular challenges posed by 
obtaining real time data and identifying contingencies in a CFD environment and possible 
approaches to these (Section 4). 
• Discussion of agent management of CFDs including topics related to the environment, 
roles, interactions, organizations, and operational conditions (Section 5) 
• Discussion of the consequences of power system failure (Section 6).  
• Discussion of contingencies, how they affect electrical systems and the public, and how 
they can progress to major failures with the August 14, 2003 blackout as an example 
(Section 7). 
Section 8 addresses security considerations for a CFD environment: 
• Assumptions held for this report (Section 8.1) 
• Definition of security- and network-related terms and concepts (Section 8.2) 
• Description of the Common Criteria methodology for defining generic security policies 
and identifying specific security functions for devices and processes for a specific system 
(Section 8.3) 
• FACTS Information assets (Section 8.4) 
• A description of security features and assets that come from the Supervisory Control And 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) system used to operate the electric power system (Section 8.5) 
• Vulnerabilities of CFD systems (Section 8.6) 
• Good security practices (Section 8.7) 
• Agent-based security (Section 8.8) 
• Discussion of a Network situational awareness and visualization tool developed by Center 
for Cyber Defenders (CCD) students and its application to analysis of a CFD environment 
(Section 8.9) 
• Security documentation (Section 8.10) 
Sections for Conclusions, (Section 9), References (Section 10), and Definitions (Section 11) 
complete the report. 
                                                
2 As used in this report, a CFD system is an operational group of CFDs; a CFD environment is an 
electric power system that includes a CFD system as part of its control mechanism. 
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2 Power Transmission System Reference Model and Context 
The Power Transmission System (PTS) is composed of a power network, consisting of 
generators, transmission lines, and distribution lines; and a control system, consisting of 
switches, sensors, actuators, etc. Any FACTS devices in use would be considered part of the 
control system.  
The IEEE 118-bus system is the reference PTS for this report. In the analysis of an actual 
system, determining the extent of the system being analyzed may not be trivial, given that 
any particular subset of the US transmission/distribution grid is connected to the rest. 
Usually, the analysis of a system will be limited to the generation and transmission system in 
the region under consideration, with the distribution systems represented as aggregate loads 
and some representation of the interties with other regions. This is consistent with how actual 
transmission systems are typically operated.  
There are several commonly recognized key concerns in operating power systems. The 
following list of key concerns is abstracted from the final North America Electric Reliability 
Council (NERC) April 2003 Blackout Report [NERC]:  
1. Monitor the power system to ensure thermal limits are not exceeded – Power equipment 
is designed to operate safely and reliably to a certain maximum level. If that level is 
exceeded, the equipment starts to overheat, and relay devices isolate the equipment to 
prevent damage. The system operates so that these limits are not reached and unnecessary 
outages are prevented.  
2. Balance generation and demand – At all times, there must be adequate system generation 
to meet the loads being delivered to municipalities and commercial customers. 
3. Balance reactive power to maintain voltage – In addition to meeting adequate generation, 
voltages must be kept at appropriate levels because downstream load equipment can 
operate only within narrow voltage ranges without damage. 
4. Keep the system stable – A system could have proper overall system voltage and 
frequency yet be unstable due to the concentration of power flow in certain regions. 
Careful control is needed to maintain stable flow.  
5. Maintain adequate reserves – At any time, a given generator or transmission line may 
fail. Additional reserves must be ready to come into service in a timely manner to absorb 
load when generation failures occur. 
6. Plan for normal operations – Adequate planning involves long-term planning to address 
forecast changes in demand, then increasing generation and transmission assets and 
maintaining or replacing equipment to meet the projected needs. 
7. Plan for emergencies – Emergency plans are sometimes referred to as contingency, 
remedial, or blackstart plans. They are remedial action plans to address unanticipated 
conditions and to restart existing or replace lost generation when blackouts and 
brownouts occur. 
These concerns are relevant in the context of this report because a group of CFDs must 
address these same concerns for the environment in which they are operating. Items 1 – 5 are 
ongoing daily and moment-by-moment concerns, while 6 and 7 are longer-term concerns.  
Item 1 (Monitor the power system to ensure thermal limits are not exceeded), is primarily 
handled by local relays that detect overload conditions for generators, transmission lines, 
transformers, etc., and take them out of service before they reach thermal limits. Once a 
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thermal limit is reached, either the equipment will be significantly damaged or a considerable 
portion of its life depleted, hence the need for automated relays. Operators should manage the 
system to avert overload conditions so that equipment does not go out of service because of 
thermal overloads. 
Items 2 (Balance generation and demand), 3 (Balance reactive power to maintain voltage), 
and 4 (Keep the system stable) are operational concerns, typically handled on a time scale of 
minutes to hours by a combination of system operators and automated control systems. Some 
of this automation includes market systems in new deregulated environments in which 
generation is scheduled and dispatched on an hourly to daily basis depending on the most 
competitive sources available at the time. Bidding is managed independently by a Regional 
Transmission Organization (RTO) or Independent System Operator (ISO). Primarily, 
operators ensure that there is adequate power flow distribution within the system, both in 
terms of the actual power flows and the reactive flows that affect voltage levels. When low 
voltages occur, operators activate devices such as capacitors, transformers, and FACTS 
devices to remedy the system and even out the distribution. Operators also ensure that 
adequate generation reserves are maintained should a particular unit trip offline, as well as 
monitoring alarms and line faults in the system. Tools such as state estimators are also 
employed to predict how the system will react to particular contingencies.  
Item 4 (Keep the system stable) is the most complex issue in a power system. This 
complexity has several relevant aspects. 
First, it is difficult to quantify aggregate power system behavior, because of the many 
interacting components, and to accurately and quickly predict the future state of a power 
system, because this requires near-complete real-time system state information and high-
throughput power flow state estimation software.  
Second, the response of ordinary power systems to inputs is nonlinear and affected by many 
independent elements (resistance and reactance of generators and lines, existing flows, etc.). 
Under normal conditions, the power system state is either static or changes slowly, which 
allows relatively easy analysis of system change. However, when a system undergoes 
significant rapid change due to faults or instability, the equipment parameters also change. 
Transient and subtransient impedances can be substituted for normal values to simplify 
analysis of these effects, but these approximations result in unpredictable inaccuracies for 
multiple interacting devices in a large system.  
Finally, there are several classes of stability problems, and each can be further subdivided 
based on local and regional effects. These classes are interrelated, but the stability problems 
are different. The following list and information is taken from [Kundur]: 
• Rotor Angle (Transient) Stability – The power system consists, in large part, of 
interconnected, synchronous three-phase devices, primarily generators and motors. Each 
device has a rotating mass, referred to in general as the rotor. When such a device is in 
steady state, the input mechanical torque and the output electrical torque of the rotor are 
balanced. When a disturbance occurs, either an acceleration or deceleration of the rotor 
occurs, causing it to go relatively faster or slower. When this proceeds beyond a certain 
limit, the affected device loses synchronism and is shut down by protective mechanisms. 
The concomitant loss of load or generated power causes additional instability. The 
instability can then propagate to other devices, resulting in a large outage. This has been 
the most studied problem and it is local to individual machines, so rotor angle stability 
problems have been addressed extensively, resulting in excitation and damping devices to 
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control fluctuations and mechanisms for quick identification and isolation of failed 
machines. For small local disturbances, time frames for the effects are on the order of 10–
20 seconds and for large regional disturbances on the order of 3–10 seconds. 
• Voltage Stability – Voltage stability is largely concerned with maintaining steady voltage 
distributions in a power system to keep any one area from having low voltages. Voltage 
problems occur as a result of either disturbances (e.g., faults, equipment failure, etc.) or 
changing load patterns over time that cause increases in certain areas that are not properly 
mitigated. In essence, for a particular line or generator, if there is too much impedance in 
the system, particularly during heavy loads, the voltage drops in a particular line or 
generator and leads to low voltages at these locations. Extreme low voltage can lead to 
brownout conditions can result in power outages if equipment is taken out of service by 
voltage-detecting relays. Capacitor banks, transformer tap changers, and FACTS devices 
are used to increase reactance levels to boost voltages in areas where it has decreased and 
also permits power flows to be maintained. Depending on the nature of the voltage 
condition and whether it is local or regional, time frames of interest are on the order of 
seconds to tens of minutes. Longer-term voltage changes can be controlled by operators. 
Short-term changes, if critical, rely on automation to mitigate. For example, many areas 
have implemented low-voltage detection and load-shedding schemes that drop loads 
sequentially to maintain the integrity of the system when voltage drops significantly.  
• Frequency Stability – Frequency stability is concerned with maintaining steady frequency 
within a narrow range of values following disturbances that result in large imbalances 
between generation and load. Equipment is designed to handle frequency excursions that 
occur during normal load changes. However, when large changes occur, there may be 
inadequate generation to cover load, inadequacies in the ability of equipment to respond to 
the changes, and poor coordination of protection equipment, all of which contribute to 
frequency instability. These conditions are not modeled in transient or voltage-stability 
studies because they invoke the actions of processes and controls, such as local device 
relay settings and inadequate unanticipated device response times, making them the most 
difficult for which to design mitigations. Often remedies for these problems cannot be 
discovered until after the fact because they are not modeled. In a large system, if two 
regions differ significantly in frequency, there can be islanding or isolation of the two 
systems. Time frames of interest for frequency stability conditions are on the order of 
seconds to tens of minutes. However, since frequency changes affect equipment controls 
such as generator outputs, even small changes can have lingering affects for several 
minutes. 
In the development of a CFD environment, each of these concerns must be taken into 
account. Stability poses the most complex set of challenges. The CFDs will be operating in 
the context of an existing power system so will be subject to the same constraints and 
limitations as the existing interconnected power system. Setpoint changes within the CFD 
environment must be managed in such a way that all of the concerns with balancing power, 
maintaining voltages, operating equipment below their designed limits, and keeping the 
system stable are met at all times. 
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3 Description of a System of Cooperating FACTS Devices 
3.1 Standalone FACTS Function and Operations 
A FACTS device directly controls the flows on a single transmission line. Indirectly, this 
affects the flows on other lines within the network by distributing the flows based on the 
network parameters. FACTS devices use a combination of transformers and Voltage-Sourced 
Converters (VSCs) to provide control of network flows. Common types of commercial 
FACTS devices are described below. 
3.1.1 Voltage-Sourced Converter 
Voltage-sourced Converters (VSCs) are six-pulse converters consisting of six power 
semiconductor switching devices and anti-parallel diodes. From a direct current (DC) voltage 
source, the VSC generates a set of controllable three-phase output voltages at the frequency 
of the system voltage. Pulse width modulation is used to control the firing of the 
semiconductor switching devices, generating an “average” sine wave. Pulse width 
modulation also helps mitigate the amount of harmonics. 
3.1.2 Static Synchronous Shunt Compensator (STATCOM) 
The reactive power exchange between the VSC and the power system can be controlled by 
varying the amplitude of the VSC output voltage. A VSC that has this capability is called a 
Static Synchronous Shunt Compensator (STATCOM). If the amplitude of the output voltage 
from the VSC is increased to above that of the system voltage, the VSC injects reactive 
power into the system. If the amplitude of the output voltage from the VSC is decreased to 
below that of the system voltage, the VSC consumes reactive power from the system. Most 
often, only reactive power is injected or consumed. This is done by keeping the output 
voltage from the VSC at the same phasor angle as that of the system voltage. A shunt-
connected transformer connects the STATCOM to the power system. 
3.1.3 Static Synchronous Series Compensator (SSSC) 
The magnitude and angle of the injected voltage can be controlled by varying the amplitude 
and phase of the output voltages produced by a VSC. Such a device is called a Static 
Synchronous Series Compensator (SSSC). If the phase angle of the injected voltage is kept 
near the phase angle of the line current, only reactive power can be supplied to the system. 
However, if the phase angle of the injected voltage has free range, active power can be 
provided as well. A series-connected transformer connects the SSSC to the power system. 
3.1.4 Unified Power Flow Controller (UPFC) 
The UPFC consists of the STATCOM and the SSSC interconnected through a common DC 
bus. This combination called a Unified Power Flow Controller (UPFC) and is significantly 
more flexible than the separate functions of the STATCOM or SSSC. 
With the STATCOM and SSSC connected through a common DC bus, active power needed 
by the SSSC can be drawn from the shunt-connected converter through the DC bus. This 
makes it possible for the injected voltage to have any angle with respect to the line current, 
which in turn gives both real and reactive power control. The functionality of the STATCOM 
is remains available as well, giving a device with dual functionality and increased flexibility. 
In discussion in this report concerning FACTS devices being utilized as cooperating FACTS 
devices (CFDs), the power electronics and switch level control interactions are assumed to be 
those of a UFPC. However, other types of FACTS devices can be modeled as CFDs if the 
limitations of these devices with respect to a UPFC are considered. 
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3.2 Assumptions about Cooperating FACTS Device Operation 
These assumptions make explicit the baseline understanding of FACTS device operation 
upon which the analysis in this report is based. 
1. An operational FACTS device is associated with, and identified by, a branch of a network.  
2. Each FACTS device is initialized so that when the device is energized, it is prepared to 
receive and transmit information necessary to cooperate with other FACTS devices.  
3. When a FACTS device does not have sufficient information to adopt a cooperative stance 
with other FACTS devices, it defaults to predefined setpoint levels or specific operational 
protocols according to the set policies. 
4. The normative behavior of a standalone FACTS device is the regulation of power flow on 
its assigned branch according to a set of parameter values obtained independently of the 
FACTS system (e.g., predetermined settings based on policy and/or economic 
considerations). 
5. The essential function of a CFD (as distinct from the function of a standalone FACTS 
device) is to maintain a higher or lower current flow on its assigned branch than if no 
cooperation were occurring. 
6. The power flow to be maintained by a given CFD is established in cooperation with the 
other CFDs within the overall CFD environment. 
7. CFDs cooperate with one another to achieve and maintain a network state specified by a 
designated policy. The policies involve managing CFD setpoints according to the flow-
allocation algorithm in use and following rules for interactions. 
8. CFDs communicate with one another by some means, such as the IP protocol discussed in 
Section 8 below.  
3.3 Hardware/Software Integrated System 
3.3.1 Algorithms of Interest 
This section describes the algorithms necessary for a CFD system that would not be needed 
for a power system with no CFDs. 
• Initialization 
o At system startup the hardware and software elements of the system are initialized 
according to a specified process. When an individual branch controlled by a CFD is de-
energized and then re-energized, the settings for that branch need to be determined 
according to a specified process. Settings based on network conditions would involve 
communication with other CFDs and/or the network’s SCADA system. 
o The system must be in a steady state condition before long-term control can be 
activated. The long-term control process must be notified when the initial steady state 
has been reached. Dynamic control might begin at initialization using limits based on 
policy or on the limits of the individual branch, or it might wait for the establishment of 
steady state and information from other CFDs. A two-stage process is possible in which 
policy-based settings are replaced by cooperatively derived limits. How this occurs is 
important to the operation of the system but is not addressed in this report. 
• Dynamic Control – Dynamic control responds to power fluctuations on a transmission line 
and provides control when transitioning between FACTS setpoints. When multiple CFDs 
are operating, it is important that they adopt and put into operation new setpoints in such a 
way that significant transients and instability do not occur. 
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• Long-Term Control3 – Long-term control uses a flow-allocation algorithm to identify a 
desired network configuration and the branch setpoints that the configuration implies, in 
particular a set of setpoints for the branches controlled by FACTS devices. Setpoints of 
other branches in the network may also be specified for monitoring purposes, but they 
cannot be directly controlled by any system element4. The values of the FACTS-controlled 
setpoints are derived from the optimal power flow on each branch of the network. 
Branches controlled by FACTS devices can then be constrained to allow no more than the 
amount of power determined by the algorithm. Determination of which branches in a 
network should be controlled by FACTS devices is the subject of research; see, for 
example, [Chaloupek], which discusses the use of genetic algorithms to determine 
effective FACTS device placement. 
The Ford-Fulkerson optimization algorithm has been described in use for the FACTS case 
in [Armbruster1], [Armbruster2], [Armbruster3], and [McMillin]. This algorithm enables 
the maximum power flow through the network. Another possibility, of interest because 
networks are often not at capacity, is to minimize the variance in the fraction of branch 
capacity being carried by each branch over all system branches. When measured by this 
metric a network in which some branches were carrying very little power and others were 
nearly at capacity would not score as well as one where every branch was carrying nearly 
the same percentage of its capacity. This metric would allow a result comparable to a 
maximum flow condition if a value near 100% could be achieved. Gradient-descent-type 
algorithms have also been considered. 
[Vlachogiannis] presents an ant colony system (ACS) method for network–constrained 
optimization problems in which the constrained load flow (CLF) problem is a distributed 
combinatorial optimization problem. Cooperating artificial “ants” cooperate to find an 
optimum solution to the CLF problem. A pheromone matrix in the role of global memory 
provides the cooperative framework. The ACS algorithm is applied to the IEEE 14-bus 
system and the IEEE 136-bus system. The results of the ant-based algorithm, a 
probabilistic CLF algorithm, and reinforcement learning (RL) methods are compared to 
show the benefits and flexibility of the ACS algorithm.  
Each algorithm has strengths and weaknesses in terms of the computational requirements, 
accuracy, communication, and processing required of the CFDs in an operational 
environment. From a security perspective the relevant concerns are the amount of 
communication needed to execute the cooperative result and the effect of incorrect or 
missing information on the distributed computation. The more communication that must 
occur, the greater the exposure of the computation to propagation of errors and the greater 
the effect of perturbed information flow, the greater the consequence of a disturbance. 
There is inherently more risk in higher-communication higher-consequence computations. 
3.3.2 Hardware Elements 
This section discusses the hardware needed in addition to the transformers and VSCs 
discussed in Section 3.1 to enable FACTS device functionality. 
                                                
3 “Long-term control” is control of phenomena that occur on a scale of seconds/minutes. The 
distinction is needed because FACTS devices also provide dynamic control, which deals with 
phenomena that occur at time scales of micro- to milliseconds. 
4 They may be indirectly controlled, however, by the CFD system as a whole. 
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• DSP Board – The Digital Signal Processor (DSP) board obtains analog information 
(voltage, current, etc.) from the power electronics sensors and processes it for the 
controllers, and contains the IGBT controls that enable device power electronics to 
execute the setpoint changes. The DSP control elements are typically hardware encoded, 
since their operations are deterministic.  
• Power Electronics – The power electronics consist of the voltage and current sensors, 
transformers, inverters, capacitors, etc., that interface with the power line to carry out the 
setpoint changes determined by the long term and dynamic controls. They are mediated by 
the DSP. As with the DSP, these functions are hardware encoded. 
• Local Power Line – Though this is not part of FACTS device itself, it is important to 
include given that the flows on the local power line are sensed and controlled directly by 
the FACTS device. At the University of Missouri/Rolla, a hardware-in-the-loop simulator 
that includes resistive loads and a motor-driven generator is used to produce actual local 
power line flows that are sensed and modulated by the CFD devices. 
3.3.3 Software Elements 
• Embedded Computers – Dynamic and long-term control is implemented in software 
residing in an embedded computer within each FACTS device. In FACTS devices 
currently operating, this computer has a commercial off-the-shelf operating system (OS). 
This is not likely to change as FACTS devices are more widely deployed. The operating 
system is the source of significant vulnerability to everyday hacker intrusions, viruses, 
worms, trojans, and other “malware.” This is primarily because the common operating 
systems are widely exposed to adversarial experimentation and are attractive targets 
because of their widespread use. Conversely, hardening and security maintenance of the 
OS at the system-administrator level (maintaining accurate access control lists, eliminating 
unused processes, consistently upgrading and patching, active firewall, etc.) is the single 
most relevant act in protecting a standalone FACTS installation. Communications 
packages, agents, and algorithms that support FACTS functionality for both standalone 
and cooperative operation should be treated as specific applications and as such are 
subject to maintenance updates and are themselves potential targets of adversarial activity. 
• Digital Signal Processor – The onboard processor of the FACTS device’s digital signal 
processing (DSP) board is considered part of the FACTS device. The operating system 
and software running on the DSP are subject to maintenance updates and present another 
security risk. This computer will probably not utilize a conventional operating system 
since it is not a general-purpose computer, although reduced-footprint Linux systems are 
increasingly common in such applications. Although somewhat less vulnerable than the 
device’s general processor, the DSP is more difficult to harden and maintain since it 
customarily has a more esoteric OS and interface. Nevertheless, successful adversarial 
penetration of this processor can result in complete malfunction of the FACTS device 
since this is the route by which information about the electric power system enters. 
• Switch-level control – Software running on processors at levels near the hardware 
switching elements is likely to reside in electronically programmable read-only memory 
(EPROM) or other near-hardwired devices. It is less exposed to the outside network and 
harder to modify. It should be included in a risk analysis, however, because of the 
potential for complete cooption of device function if penetration occurs. 
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Figure 1 is a representation of how information flows occur in an individual FACTS device 
for the hardware and software elements described above. 
Figure 1. Information flows in and around an individual FACTS device 
3.4 Cooperating FACTS Function and Operations 
A single Flexible A/C Transmission Systems (FACTS) device directly affects flow on its 
assigned branch. In changing the flow on its own branch, however, the CFD also indirectly 
affects flow on the other branches in the network, the nature and magnitude of which can be 
calculated using Kirchoff’s laws. The combined direct and indirect effects of multiple well-
placed, correctly operated FACTS devices throughout a network can result in near-optimal 
power flow on a network-wide basis. 
This section describes the baseline desired behavior of a set of CFDs providing long-term 
control of a network. The CFDs establish a set of setpoints, one for each of the branches 
controlled by the individual CFDs. In practice, recalculation of setpoints can be driven by 
any of several causes: a predetermined schedule, a loss of a branch or generator, a large 
increase in load, and other events5 that significantly alter the power system’s load carrying 
requirements. This cooperative behavior is referred to as “long-term control” in the High 
Order Object-oriented Modeling Technique (HOOMT) diagrams [Ryan]. Setpoints based on 
such cooperative goals are referred to as long-term setpoints. 
A FACTS device is made capable of cooperating by adding algorithms and communication 
capability to the standalone device. These allow it to communicate with other FACTS 
devices and to receive information about parts of the power network of which it would 
otherwise remain ignorant. The added communication capability enables execution of 
distributed flow-allocation algorithms such as distributed MaxFlow.  
                                                
5
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3.5 Computation of long-term setpoints 
The outcome of any computation intended to provide appropriate power system control 
information to a group of CFDs is a set of flow limits, one for each branch controlled by a 
FACTS device6. These flow limits are referred to as setpoints. For the purposes of this report, 
algorithms capable of providing outcomes of this sort are called flow-allocation algorithms. 
The general MaxFlow algorithm [Armbruster2] is one such algorithm. 
Computation of long-term setpoints proceeds approximately as follows: 
1. The CFDs begin with a mutually agreed-upon current network state as an initial reference. 
The current state can be used to back track in the case of a failure or damage that alters the 
network. Depending on the details of the algorithm to be executed, the network state may 
be for the global network or just for a portion of the network that falls under each CFD 
jurisdiction.  
2. The CFDs arrive at a mutually agreed-upon desired network state. 
a. This may be established a priori by policy, according to the selected flow allocation 
algorithm; for MaxFlow, the mutually agreed-upon, desired network state is any state in 
which no branch of the network exceeds the maximum flow state.  
b. According to the HOOMT diagrams in [Ryan], long-term control uses the current 
network state, the compute_next_level_setpoint method, and FACTS power system 
configuration information to calculate the setpoints that give maximum flow. 
c. Observation suggests that optimization is not always necessary (e.g. when the amount 
of power flowing in the network is significantly less than its capacity)7. This implies 
that the network state in such cases is within the parameters of the desired network 
state. This is the case in the practical MaxFlow algorithm, where the network’s 
operational steady state is the desired state and, as a result, no change is perceived to be 
necessary. When no contingencies or major state changes occur, the setpoints don’t 
change, and each CFD simply maintains its setpoint. 
d. It might be the case that the capacity of a well-designed network under ordinary 
conditions of load and generation will never be exceeded; that is, the network would be 
in an undesirable state only in the case of contingencies that significantly alter the 
network’s ability to produce, deliver, or use power. 
3. The CFDs produce a mutually agreed-upon set of discrepancies between the desired and 
current network states. The discrepancies may be predefined as variances from some 
baseline condition and left for the individual devices to deal with. In the distributed case, 
information about the discrepancies is communicated to other CFDs, as in distributed 
MaxFlow. Section 7, Contingency Analysis, discusses how contingencies cause these 
discrepancies to occur.  
                                                
6 It is not necessary for the set ever to be assembled in one place, but each CFD must have the flow 
limits for its branch as a result of the computation. 
7 The capacity of a network is the placement and magnitude of all loads when the network is in a state 
such that additional load anywhere in the network causes breakers to trip. This is the “maximum 
flow” referred to in [Armbruster2]. Note a network being at capacity does not necessarily mean that 
every individual branch is at capacity. 
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The primary undesirable condition is an unbalanced network, i.e., some branches are 
carrying more than average loading8 (with greater line loss) and some are carrying less. If 
the network as a whole is under capacity, this is not of great concern; efficiency might be 
lower than desired but network operation is not in jeopardy. 
If the network is at capacity, the unbalanced condition implies that some individual 
branches are under capacity. Although the under-capacity branches could carry more 
power, some fraction of any added power will flow through branches already at capacity 
(by Kirchoff’s Current Law) and cause them to overload. In essence, there is unused9 
transmission capacity in a network that’s at capacity but unbalanced. 
Note the limiting capacity needs to be carefully considered for each electrical device. For 
example, power lines have different thermal, load, and stability limits depending on the 
length of the line and the configuration of the rest of the system, so the limiting factor and 
capacity condition will depend on which of these limits is most constraining for each line 
in the system. Similar caution applies to generators and other power equipment. 
4. CFDs produce a set of setpoints intended to reduce or eliminate the discrepancies between 
the current network state and the desired network state. 
The major benefit of utilizing CFDs is that branches at or near capacity can be constrained 
to carry no more power than their maximum capacity permits, i.e. held at 100% of 
allowable loading. Under such conditions, additional power (again based on KCL) would 
seek some other path (i.e., less-loaded branches). Note that if branches exceed short term 
overloading capacity for too long, they will open up via local relays. CFDs must be able to 
respond to avoid as many of these conditions as possible. 
5. Each CFD acts to maintain the setpoint for its assigned branch. 
a. The setpoint for each particular branch is sent to dynamic control where it is used along 
with local branch data (from current and voltage sensors that sit within the UPFC 
device) to calculate the setpoints needed to transition the branch from the current state 
to the desired state using the compute_next_level_setpoint() method (see [Ryan]). 
b. Information would also be sent here in the wake of a contingency, requesting dynamic 
control’s help in mitigating it.  
c. This control data are then sent to the DSP board. Here, IGBT control takes the control 
data, along with local branch data (again, from the voltage and current sensors that sit 
within the UPFC device), and calculates the switch settings for the voltage source 
inverter using the compute_next_level_setpoint() method.  
d. From here, the switch settings are sent to the IGBT Driver and Protection Board within 
the voltage source inverter. The driver then sends switch_on/switch_off commands to 
each of the six IGBT switches according to the switch settings that are sent to it which 
in turn with other power electronics elements, maintains or changes setpoints. 
                                                
8 “Loading” is an imprecise term used here to refer to the amount of power a branch is carrying as 
compared to the amount it is able to carry (i.e., its capacity).  
9 Such unused capacity is not merely unused; without cooperating FACTS devices, it’s unusable. 
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4 FACTS Information Flows & Repositories  
Figure 2 is referred to in the following discussion of the information flows that occur in 
carrying out the operation of cooperating FACTS devices (CFDs) in an electric power 
system. The illustration depicts the basic interactions of CFDs in a power system. The 
interactions occur in the context of a power system with generation, transmission, 
distribution, and end users, and each FACTS device controls the flows in a particular 
transmission line. 
 
Figure 2. Notional FACTS layout and its relationship to the power system 
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As with a standalone FACTS, a CFD system will interact with the power system controls via 
the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system to maintain setpoints on 
individual branches.  
The long-term control interactions involve both the interactions necessary for the execution 
of the optimization algorithm (e.g., Max Flow) computed collectively by the FACTS devices 
and all CFD-related ancillary and management communication, such as managing execution 
of setting changes and verifying that other FACTS devices are valid. 
Some interactions occur only in a CFD environment. Interactions between the CFD System 
and the SCADA system will include the same control, setting, and status information relayed 
back and forth between the SCADA control system and the individual FACTS devices. In 
addition, each FACTS device will obtain system status data from the control area that it 
manages in order to know the current network state and compute the desired state as 
described above. Specific problems that may occur with these data needs (error correction, 
synchronous data, and limits in data availability) are addressed in Section 4.6.  
Dynamic control must avoid interaction among FACTS devices that can generate transients 
in the system when executing the long-term control settings. Each of these interactions needs 
to be considered independently and in relation to the others. 
4.1 Switch-Level Control Interactions 
Switch-level control interaction involves the sensor information needed by the FACTS 
device for monitoring and the executed control actions that are based on information passed 
from dynamic control to the DSP, which determines the reference signals that set the value of 
the branch power flows. Once the reference points are set, onboard power electronics execute 
the setting by injecting current and voltage into the power line through the inverters and 
transformers to modify the power flow to the set values. The switch-level control interactions 
of a CFD are the same as those of a standalone FACTS device. The differences lie in how the 
long-term and dynamic controls work to modify the setpoints that are passed on to switch-
level controls. Figure 3 shows the arrangement of switches in the UPFC. 
 
Figure 3. Switch-level architecture of the UPFC FACTS device 
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Table 1 shows the types of Input/Output (I/O) utilized by the switch level control interactions 
in a CFD modeled as a UPFC FACTS device in a CFD environment. 
Table 1. Switch-Level Control Interactions I/O 
Inputs Type Source  Purpose 
Local Readings (Voltage, 
Current, Power) 
Analog Power devices (CTs, PTs, etc.) Gain local power line 
information  
Reference Settings (Vref, 
Zref, Qref, ref) 
Digital Obtained from Dynamic and Long 
Term Control 
References to determine how to 
apply settings the CFD line 
Parameter Settings and 
Measured Variables 
Digital Derived from combination of fixed 
settings, current operational 
setpoints, and system conditions 
Ensure that the CFD operates 
within both internal limitations 
and system constraints 
 
Outputs Type Source  Purpose 
Inject Voltage and Current Analog Series and Shunt Transformers Execute power flow changes 
based on setpoints  
Switches N/A High voltage interruption devices Place all or part of CFD in or out 
of service 
4.2 Dynamic Control Interactions 
The dynamic control in a CFD works to ensure that when settings are changed, two different 
CFDs won’t try to execute changes at the same time or a change made in one CFD doesn’t 
trigger a responsive setpoint change in other CFDs. Either of these cases can cause stability 
problems. Dynamic control moderates the implementation of changes dictated by long-term 
control. The only interaction between dynamic and long-term control is the transmission of 
setpoints from long-term control to dynamic control (Figure 24 in [Ryan]). 
4.3 Long-Term Control Interactions 
Figure 4 depicts the information flow surrounding the maximum flow algorithm. Current 
system state and contingency information are passed to long-term control from the PTS 
through the DSP board or from the local SCADA system. When the optimization algorithm 
finishes, the desired network state is then sent to dynamic control for execution. 
Figure 4. Maximum Flow Algorithm Information Flows 
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Information is passed between FACTS devices when executing a distributed maximum flow 
algorithm as shown. Messages are passed between the long-term control algorithm 
instantiations when individual flow paths cross regional boundaries [Armbruster2], 
[McMillin]. Distributed state variables such as arc capacity, arc flow, and excess flow at the 
vertices can be included in the communication as a form of error detection in the distributed 
version of the algorithm [Armbruster3]. Table 2 shows the types of I/O utilized by the long-
term control interactions in CFDs in a CFD environment. 
Table 2. Long-Term Control Interactions I/O 
Inputs Type Source  Purpose 
Dynamic Control 
Feedback 
Digital Local CFD 
Dynamic Control 
Obtain modifications to setpoint change 
implementation to prevent oscillations 
Data Exchange with 
CFD neighbors 
Analog and 
Digital 
(Ethernet) 
Neighbor CFD  Data necessary to implement distributed max 
flow algorithm 
Control Exchange 
with CFD neighbors 
Digital 
(Ethernet) 
Neighbor CFD Information necessary for cooperative 
agreement on CFD changes 
 
Outputs Type Source  Purpose 
Dynamic Control 
Feedback 
Digital Local CFD 
Dynamic Control 
Pass computed changes and next setpoints to 
Dynamic control to execute setpoint changes 
Data Exchange with 
CFD neighbors 
Analog and 
Digital 
(Ethernet) 
Neighbor CFD  Data necessary to implement distributed max 
flow algorithm 
Control Exchange 
with CFD neighbors 
Digital 
(Ethernet) 
Neighbor CFD Information for cooperative agreement on 
CFD changes 
4.4 Software Code Elements 
Software code is located throughout the FACTS device to carry out the programming 
necessary for CFD operation. The majority of the code, for long-term and dynamic control, 
resides in the embedded computer. The DSP board and UPFC power electronics code also 
execute CFD-specific code. Different types of access to this code are required. For example, 
different levels of user privilege may be required to read system settings and sensor data, to 
change settings, and to change program files. This would require different user privileges to 
be defined and safeguards for protecting the information. 
4.5 SCADA Interactions 
SCADA interactions involve all of the information exchanged between the SCADA system 
and the FACTS device. In a standalone system, as noted above, the information will 
primarily be the readings from the FACTS branch, and possibly control signals which allow 
an operator to change the settings of the FACTS device remotely. 
In the setting of a power system with CFDs, the FACTS devices obtain power system 
network state information. As defined previously, the network state is the composite set of 
flows for each branch in the power system and incorporates the underlying network topology 
(impedances), equipment states (in-service, out), and voltage, current, and phase angles for 
system branches and nodes, which collectively indicate the overall state of the system. 
The amount of network state information required at each CFD will depend on several 
factors such as the optimization algorithm utilized, the subset of nodes and branches of the 
entire network needed to do an adequate optimization. Table 3 shows the types of I/O utilized 
in the SCADA interactions by CFDs. 
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Table 3. SCADA Interactions I/O 
Inputs Type Source  Purpose 
SCADA Analog System 
Status Data (voltage, 
current, frequency, etc.) 
Analog (via Serial or 
Ethernet links) 
Control Center 
(aggregated from 
field devices in 
remote stations) 
System status data used by CFDs 
to compute distributed max flow 
and determine setpoints 
SCADA Digital System 
Status Data (switch 
positions, equipment 
on/off) 
Digital (via Serial or 
Ethernet links) 
Control Center 
(aggregated from 
field devices in 
remote stations) 
System status data used by CFDs 
to sense contingency changes to 
help determine setpoints 
CFD Control Settings Digital (via Serial or 
Ethernet links) 
Control Center Control settings to remotely 
program and override CFD device 
settings (if applicable) 
 
Outputs Type Source  Purpose 
CFD Control Settings Digital (via Serial or 
Ethernet links) 
CFD Inform Control Center of CFD 
Settings and current setpoints 
CFD Analog and Digital 
Power Line Data 
Analog and Digital 
(via Serial or Ethernet 
links) 
CFD Inform Control Center of CFD line 
readings and status (in-service, out 
of service) 
4.6 Special Challenges in a CFD Environment 
Several special challenges are posed by the new types of information and operational 
considerations required by a CFD environment—challenges related to identifying 
contingencies and those related to how to process incomplete information obtained from the 
SCADA system. These new challenges are posed by the introduction of the use of CFDs to 
maximize power flow in power systems. Of course, automated systems such as Automatic 
Generation Control (AGC) and Remedial Action Schemes (RAS), as well as others, are used 
effectively in existing power systems. However, these systems respond and control 
individual devices to specific local settings and do not attempt to coordinate power flow for a 
region. The development and implementation of these systems has proceeded through a long 
history based on simulation and modeling, planning, and experience. In existing power 
systems, response to regional power flow change is effected through human operators, with 
the help of specified procedures and automated systems such as AGC. 
The uniqueness of a CFD environment is the attempt to control power flow regionally as well 
as for each defined CFD line. It is anticipated that the same combination of simulation, 
modeling, and experience will be necessary to properly address these challenges should a CF 
environment be utilized in future power systems. These specific challenges are discussed 
below, with a few comments on how these may begin to be addressed.  
4.6.1 Recognizing and Responding to Contingencies 
In developing a CFD system to identify, recognize, and respond to contingencies, the goals 
are to “first, do no harm” by maintaining a level of reliability at least as good as that of the 
non-CFD system, and to optimize the power flow. 
It is supposed that the distributed flow allocation algorithm used by a CFD system 
(nominally the MaxFlow algorithm, but see Section 3.3.1, Algorithms of Interest) to compute 
setpoints for the CFDs will be executed on a regular, ongoing basis. Based on the results of 
the distributed computation, the CFDs will agree on the necessary setpoint changes, negotiate 
the order for executing them, and execute them. The CFDs will need to be able to recognize 
and respond to contingencies that occur in a system in at least two ways:  
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First, when a contingency occurs, the system state will change, which means the setpoints for 
the CFDs might need to be re-computed. Thus the distributed computation should be 
executed to respond to contingencies that change the system state.  
Second, if a contingency occurs in the process of negotiating changes, there must be 
safeguards, such as suspending a new change or specifying a process for dealing with these 
conditions, to prevent these changes from amplifying the stability problems resulting from 
the contingency. An approach to address these issues is to simulate and model what happens 
in a CFD environment in response to specified contingencies and during the execution of 
changes to the system and make adjustments to policies and processes based on the results.  
The trigger for re-computation of the distributed allocation algorithm depends on how the 
contingencies of interest are recognized. Section 7 discusses the kinds of contingency that 
can occur, including transmission and generation equipment failures and large load changes. 
Relevant questions in this context are: Which of these classes should trigger recomputation 
and what signatures should be used as triggers?  
If the system recognizes and responds to too many small contingencies, the constant flood of 
change requests will prevent normal operation of the CFDs. On the other hand, if the 
definition of contingency is too restrictive, the system may not respond to important events. 
One approach is to define a set of contingencies (such as the pre-identified N-1 contingencies 
identified by system studies) to which the system will respond and re-compute the allocation 
algorithm whenever such contingencies occur. From there, other types of situations, such as 
heavily loaded lines or low-voltage conditions, can be considered as triggers. Once the CFD 
system is responding to a set of contingencies, operators can begin collecting performance 
data and honing the trigger conditions based on statistical analysis of the system’s behavior. 
An equally important question is how to differentiate between true contingencies and false 
triggers generated by an adversary. The general approach is to prevent malicious attacks of 
this type, but if this fails the system may be placed in a denial-of-service flood of false 
contingency triggers or be misled into recomputing false results by bogus data. As above, a 
data collection/statistical analysis result might yield distinguishing characteristics, but, as is 
always the case with malicious behavior, it’s the one that the system hasn’t learned to 
recognize that causes problems. 
4.6.2 Data Completeness 
A CFD power system environment uses an allocation algorithm (e.g., MaxFlow) to calculate 
the settings for the CFDs. Accurate, near-complete information about appropriate system 
component states is needed to obtain optimal results. This section discusses this challenge 
and how it might be addressed. 
In existing power systems, there may not be sufficient information available in real time to 
completely describe the system, for several reasons. Not all devices have sensors; noncritical 
equipment may not be monitored at all. Older or non-standard sensors may provide only 
partial information and malfunctioning sensors can give incorrect information. In existing 
SCADA systems, information is retrieved from remote stations according to a predefined 
polling sequence and can be anywhere from two to ten seconds old. This means that there 
will be a lack of synchronism for the retrieved information.  
In existing power systems, there are no controls that depend directly on real-time power flow 
information, so a lack of information usually does not present a problem in operating power 
systems. On the other hand, the calculation of distributed max flow, for instance, depends on 
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complete information being available. A deployed CFD system should incorporate methods 
to counteract the inevitable lack of complete information.  
In a CFD environment, each CFD will have an area of control from which to get its portion 
of system data (see Figure 2). Each area will most likely overlap adjacent areas. To compute 
max flow, or any similar algorithm, there must be sufficient information about the system 
buses and branches to allow computation of balanced power flows. The areas must be chosen 
in such a way that the inputs and outputs to the system balance and there must be adequate 
information about the system to enable successful completion of the distributed calculation.  
In a SCADA-based environment, each CFD will obtain system information from the power 
system control center. Dedicated sensor and data systems could be implemented for the CFD 
system, but this would probably be prohibitively expensive. In existing SCADA systems, 
data from remote sensors arrive at the control center after a 2- to 10-second delay because the 
remote sites are cyclically polled from the control center. We assume all such data is time-
tagged, but data available for a given calculation might not all refer to the same time period10, 
even if it is complete per the previous paragraph. If the system were changing rapidly, the 
magnitude of differences in values and asynchronicity could preclude completing the power 
flow calculations, and thus, for CFDs, determining maximum flow. This doesn’t affect 
existing systems, because they don’t require real-time data for executing controls11. 
Any approach to this challenge should include examination of the power system state 
estimators used in existing power systems. Power flow computation in a CFD environment is 
analogous to state estimation in a conventional SCADA system; in both cases, input is 
incomplete and out of sync and the results are used in making control decisions. In 
conventional systems, however, results are not used for direct control, only as input for 
human decisionmakers determining how to respond to contingencies and allocate resources. 
State estimators analytically estimate the flow on each branch of a network topology utilizing 
available system data (line impedances, voltages, power flows, equipment availability, etc.). 
They are essentially power flow calculators modified to execute with incomplete 
information, hence their relevance to CFD computations. In general, these methods 
determine the consistent system power flow state that gives the lowest level of mismatch 
between results and observations and report this as the most likely current system condition. 
This is adequate in conventional systems since the estimated system state does not directly 
control the system.  
An approach to developing a CFD optimization algorithm based on incomplete information 
would be to compare the results of running a given algorithm on two different data sets, one 
complete and the other from a state estimator using asynchronous and incomplete 
information. If the differences are great, it might be possible to develop a CFD algorithm that 
can accommodate the information limitations inherent in existing systems. If the errors 
caused by having incomplete information were such that setpoints computed by a CFD 
system with incomplete information were very close to those computed by a CFD system 
with perfect information, then that algorithm could be effectively utilized in existing systems 
with these information limitations. 
                                                
10 At least, there may be no designed system mechanism to produce temporally consistent data. 
11 There are exceptions, but they are usually limited in scope; e.g., power line protective relays and 
other automated relay protection mechanisms use specific local data taken in real time. 
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5 Using Agents to manage FACTS devices  
An agent theory specifies what an agent is and what it does. This section discusses the 
application of agent technology to power management and outlines an agent theory for 
operating a system of Cooperating FACTS Devices (CFDs). The agents of interest are 
referred to as CFD agents in this section. This section should be considered a set of 
guidelines for designing a CFD agent system. Additional comments on agent technology 
specifically related to security appear in Section 8; See Section 8.8.4, Agent-Based 
Mitigation Strategies, and Section 8.10.1.3, Agent-Based Security Policy. 
We recommend, and follow in this section, the Gaia process [Zambonelli], which considers 
the relevant issues in pragmatic order to produce the representational elements that make an 
agent theory a good agent theory: What the system knows about the world; how its actions 
are guided; the system components and their relationships with one another; how the 
system’s information state changes over time; and how the environment affects the system’s 
information state. [Zambonelli] is especially useful because it provides as examples 
application of the process to two rather different use cases. The authors also recommend 
[Rehtanz], an extensive body of work specifically tying agent technology to electric power 
control and operation. 
5.1 Consideration of Agent technology for Electric Power Management 
Whether to apply a particular technological approach should be based on whether the 
application requires the benefits offered by the technology12. Power system resources need to 
be operated and managed by a distributed system that includes at least several entities who13 
allocate resources, negotiate trades, share workload, provide redundancy, and maintain 
cybersecurity through mutual observation and response. Such elements would need to be 
social; the real-world system could not be operated by elements that could not communicate 
with one another. These elements should be autonomous, because the rapidity of power 
system phenomena dictates the ability to act with authority without seeking approval in real 
time. Finally, they should be situated, because the power system is made up of 
electromechanical components that require intervention and for which the correct control 
inputs can be ascertained only by observation of device state.  
Agents have all three capabilities. An agent is a software process (or set of processes) that is 
autonomous (can act independently of outside influence), situated (receives information from 
and acts upon its environment), and social14 (communicates with and forms organizations 
with other entities). Available agent frameworks possess these properties to different degrees, 
implement them differently, and may have other properties of interest, but these three are 
approximately definitive. Software missing one or the other of these properties might be 
called an agent, but software with all three could hardly be called anything else. In the end, 
the term “agent” is shorthand to indicate that software has (or needs for design purposes) 
these properties. An important component of the CFD agent theory is that the means by 
which security conditions and responses to security policy violations are handled is policy 
enforcement by closed coalitions of “good” agents.  
                                                
12 At least in part; cost and cost-benefit ratio need to be addressed as well, but the benefits are usually 
at least notionally developed before the more-difficult subject of cost is raised. 
13 We might have said “that” instead of “who”, but at present most of these “entities” are human. 
14 Being social is a specialization of being situated, but qualitatively different in that it requires 
different principles, protocols, languages, and ontologies. 
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CFD agents would almost certainly be deployed initially as a closed system; that is, a 
homogeneous system providing standardized services designed around a single species of 
agent. Individual agents of this closed system would be innately cooperative and trustworthy 
and have goals based on policy.  
Movement into an open system is fundamentally necessary in a market-based system, so that 
self-interested profit-motivated agents of different species can interact. Open systems are 
more difficult to design because the set of possibilities for interaction, reaction, and 
motivation is broader than in the closed case. In an open system, agents using different 
ontologies, algorithms, and motivations interact with one another to trade and transfer power. 
In addition, it is likely that systems of unknown provenance will interact with the power 
system agents in unspecified ways; an open environment essentially forces security concerns.  
5.2 Environment 
Gaia analysis of an agent-based system requires specifying the environment, the roles of the 
agents involved, how they interact with one another, how they are organized, the rules 
required of the organizational members, and the liveness and safety conditions to be 
maintained by the agents. 
The environment of an agent system consists of all the things external to the system agents 
with which they must interact to fulfill their roles. We recommend defining the environment 
as a class hierarchy, which can then be used as part of the system ontology by the agents. 
The primary classes needed by agents dealing with a CFD system: 
I. Electric power system component 
a. Source 
b. Load 
c. FACTS device 
d. Branch 
e. Bus 
f. Switch (breaker) 
II. Entity 
a. Human 
b. Agent 
c. Organization 
III. Power Flow 
5.3 Roles 
A role is a group of related goals and functions. CFD agents have five roles: 
I. Human interaction 
a. Act on executable commands 
b. Respond to requests for information 
II. Power system interaction 
a. Normal operation 
b. Contingency response 
i. Contingency recognition 
ii. Fault recovery 
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III. System state prediction, planning, and goal derivation 
a. Long-term power flow calculation (MaxFlow, Gradient descent, etc.) 
b. State prediction based on statistics 
IV. Information management 
a. Network state marshalling 
b. Common operating picture maintenance 
V. Policy Enforcement (see section 8.10.1.1, “Security Policy Elements”) 
a. Maintain safety conditions engendered by policy 
b. Act on liveness conditions engendered by policy 
c. Accept, verify, and incorporate policy updates 
5.4 Interactions 
Two kinds of entities interact: agents and organizations. Organizations interact through the 
agents of which they are composed. Distinguishing between whether an interaction is agent-
agent, agent-organization, or organization-organization can seem superfluous in a closed 
system, but becomes of paramount importance in an open system as an agent acting on behalf 
of an organization may have the authority to make commitments far beyond its local 
purview. For instance, a gateway agent might be authorized to grant access to an information 
repository or grant machine cycles for program execution; the agent’s organization would 
ultimately be the responsible party. 
Performing Gaia analysis is a two-pass operation: The first pass captures necessary agent-
agent interactions and the organizations involved; the second identifies how the organizations 
interact with one another and with individual agents. Note that were we actually executing 
the process we could not talk here about the interaction of organizations because we would 
not have identified any. 
5.5 Organizations 
In a closed system, the organizational elements are less noteworthy because the agents 
interact with one another directly and do not represent organizations. In our work with 
microgrids (see [Phillips]), we identified organizations called cells, globs, and co-ops. The 
general notion is that a cell is a set of sources and associated loads operated by a single agent; 
a glob is a group of self-interested cells that satisfy their own loads before any neighboring 
loads, and a co-op is a group of cells that may under some conditions satisfy neighboring 
loads before satisfying their own based on a shared policy. Note that this is set of 
organizational types is useful for operating a closed system but also supports the kind of 
marketplace behavior needed to operate an open system. 
5.6 Liveness and Safety Conditions 
Liveness and safety conditions are the embodiment of system operating policy and define the 
desired behavior of the agents under various conditions. Liveness conditions are conditions 
that the agent system has the goal of bringing about; safety conditions are conditions that the 
agent system has the goal of maintaining. As [Zambonelli] puts it, the liveness properties of a 
system ensure that “something good happens” and the safety properties ensure that “nothing 
bad happens.” In electric power generation and transmission, the safety conditions are the 
normal conditions, e.g., appropriate frequencies, voltages, and temperatures; and liveness 
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conditions describe the desired system behavior in response to departures from normal 
conditions, e.g., alert or emergency system conditions caused by contingencies. An example 
of a safety condition is maintaining the alternating current (A/C) frequency; the concomitant 
liveness condition is to return the system to the proper frequency when it deviates.  
The following is a set of liveness and safety conditions developed for a general distributed 
electric power management system. Conditions 6, 7, and 8 illustrate the inclusion of CFD 
concerns to the agents’ behavioral structure.  
1. Human interaction 
a. When a person with the appropriate authority issues a command that the system is able 
to obey, the system should obey the command and report that it has done so. 
b. When a person with the appropriate authority issues a command that the system cannot 
obey, the system should report that it could not obey the command and say why. 
2. Source control 
a. When total load is in excess of the maximum that the system can supply in its current 
configuration, transition to a new configuration, if any, that can supply adequate 
power. Check first for stored configurations designated as capable for equivalent loads.  
b. If there are no appropriate stored configurations, search for some. 
c. When choosing a configuration to supply power, prefer configurations that: 
i. Generate equivalent power at lower cost; 
ii. Differ less from the preceding configuration; 
iii. Have a lower system-wide average fraction of rated power being carried by all 
lines; 
iv. Supply a thermal load that occurs within the appropriate time interval 
d. If it appears that total load will at some future time exceed the maximum that the 
system can supply in its current configuration, search for other configurations in which 
the projected load can be satisfied. Record each such configuration in conjunction with 
associated load information and other information needed to select among 
configurations. Denote the configuration as capable of satisfying its associated load. 
3. Load control 
a. Maintain service to all loads. 
b. When load must be shed, shed noncritical loads before critical loads. 
c. Prefer supplying critical loads to shutting down sources for maintenance. 
d. Prefer shutting down sources for maintenance to supplying noncritical loads. 
e. If it appears that projected load will soon be greater than the system can supply, 
determine the order in which to shed existing loads and which loads should be shed. 
4. Maintenance scheduling 
a. Take components offline as required by their maintenance schedules. 
b. As a component nears 90% of its mean time before failure (MTBF), assign it high 
priority for being taken offline. 
c. Take any component that exceeds 90% of its MTBF offline for maintenance (may be 
overridden by 3c). 
5. Distribution path 
a. When a distribution path fails, compute the power flow for the remaining network and 
determine whether any of the remaining lines will be forced to carry more power than 
their rated capacities. 
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If a line is carrying more than its rated capacity, and there exists some other line not in 
service whose placement into service will allow a new load distribution where no lines 
are overloaded, place that line into service. If more than one such line exists, choose 
the line for which the system-wide average fraction of rated power being carried by all 
lines is lowest when the system is placed in the suggested configuration. 
b. When the steady-state power flow through any power system element exceeds its 
maximum steady-state rating, transition to a new configuration that will bring all 
system power-flows into specification. Such reconfiguration may involve a prioritized 
shedding of noncritical heat loads or those that can be served by other heat sources. 
6. FACTS long-term control 
a. When an event occurs that has been designated a trigger for recomputation of long-
term setpoints, notify the other members of the CFD group that this event has occurred 
and, depending on policy for that event type, either: 
i. prepare local data for inclusion in a system state object, or 
ii. prepare local data for transmission to group members who need it. 
b. When data needed for recomputation of power-flow allocation has been appropriately 
marshaled for transmission, transmit it to the group members who need it. 
c. When a complete data set as needed for recomputation of power-flow allocation is 
received, execute the complete-data form of the power-flow allocation computation 
using the complete data set. 
d. When computation of power-flow allocation should begin based on timing 
considerations, but the data needed for computation is incomplete, execute the 
incomplete-data form of the power-flow calculation using the data set as-is. 
e. When computation of power-flow allocation is complete, adopt the relevant output 
values (i.e., those that apply to the branch assigned to the FACTS device performing 
the calculation) as long-term control targets.  
7. When power-flow allocation recomputation has been triggered but communication with 
some group CFDs is not possible, adopt a reduced-group stance, including reduced-group 
data requirements, communication profiles, and algorithmic forms. 
8. When no communication with other group CFDs is possible, adopt and implement the 
standalone long-term control values for the assigned branch.  
 
Two tables that appear in [Habur], entitled “Steady-state applications of FACTS” and 
“Dynamic applications of FACTS,” show the corrective actions that a standalone FACTS 
device can take to avoid or correct various undesirable power system conditions. These tables 
constitute a list of liveness and safety conditions for standalone FACTS devices. Since a 
UPFC15 contains both a STATCOM and an SSSC, entries in the “Corrective Action” column 
are potential responses of a UPFC if any of {STATCOM, SSSC, UPFC} appears in the 
“FACTS device” column. This applies to both Tables. 
                                                
15 The FACTS devices being studied at UMR are UPFCs. 
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5.7 Conclusions about the CFD Agent System  
A distributed agent coalition managing an electric power system is the locus for power 
system operational and security policy and can enforce both policies. The primary benefits of 
an agent-oriented approach are: 
1. Separation of concern – the agents’ role is to do what agents are good at, and the CFD 
systems’ role is to do what the CFD system is good at, so, in theory, problems of cross-
coupling, interference, and redesign are avoided.  
2. Ready provision of distributed services – An agent framework that incorporates the 
appropriate social elements—communication, negotiation, group formation—is required.  
3. Relatively straightforward policy enforcement – translation from human-readable system 
policy to a set of liveness and safety conditions that the agent system can enforce is 
relatively easy, again given the appropriate agent framework. 
4. Integration of operational and security policy – violations of operational policy can trigger 
an enhanced security stance (more-frequent requests for identification, performing 
encryption where none had been required in the absence of suspected penetration, 
requirement of group signatures, etc.); conversely an enforced and well-thought-out 
security policy can ensure robust operation with graceful degradation in the face of 
security attacks and penetration. 
Based on the material in this report, prior consideration of agents used for managing electric 
power, and significant support from the literature, it appears that agents constitute an 
enhanced context for cooperative FACTS operations by providing a host of framework 
services, including communication processes, cooperation utilities, enforcement of security 
and operations policies, security operations, cooperative fault isolation, distributed algorithm 
execution, data marshalling utilities, and real-time cooperative planning to respond to 
unexpected contingencies. At least some of these capabilities have been demonstrated, but 
the cooperative agent-based system that reliably and regularly executes them all doesn’t 
exist. Our primary contention here is that if there were such a framework, distributed secure 
cooperative grid operations would be much easier to realize. 
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6 Consequences of Failure in an Electric Power System 
The types of failure consequence in an electric power system are the same, regardless of the 
failure vector, the size of the impact, or whether the system involves agents and FACTS 
devices or not. This section provides a description of the consequences to power systems of 
failures, whether they are from natural causes or from malicious intent. 
6.1 Consequence Metrics 
Regional control areas (RTOs, ISOs, etc.) and utilities use fairly standard metrics to track the 
impacts of power outages. The three most common measures are the frequency of outages, 
the average duration of an outage, and the impact of the outage in terms of both loss of power 
and energy. The data are based both upon historical information and modeling. These data 
are often put into statistical form such as the likelihood that a particular outage will occur and 
how long it will take. In this way, depending on the amount of data a particular area has, 
there can be different types of data for particular regions, customers, and likelihoods of 
different severity of outages. This information is also used in the market to sell different 
levels of expected reliability to different sets of customers. Moreover, similar metrics can 
track other important metrics such as frequency and duration of overload conditions on lines.  
• Frequency – There are different measures of frequencies for failures, such as the number 
of anticipated failures/year or the probability of a failure at any minute. The data can be 
aggregate for the entire system, or particularized to a location. 
• Duration – The duration measures the duration of failures and as with frequency measures 
can be represented and aggregated in different ways. 
• Size of Curtailment – The size of the curtailment can include both the probable power loss 
(MW) and energy loss (MWH) and, as with frequency and duration, can be represented 
and aggregated in different ways. 
6.2 Public Consequences 
This section describes different kinds of public consequences.  
• Health and Safety – Safety impacts cover power failure events that affect public safety. 
Although people do die from the secondary effects of catastrophic power failures, and a 
few dozen people are killed each year by contact with energized lines, power outages do 
not directly cause large numbers of injuries and deaths. This is primarily due to backup 
systems in critical places—hospitals, e.g.—placed there based on knowledge that even 
short interruptions would be fatal to some and the experience that power does occasionally 
fail. However, extended outages tax emergency systems, which by-and-large were not 
designed to operate for long periods, and affect the safety of those living in electrically 
heated or cooled homes “in season.” In short, infrastructures are adapted to deal with short 
outages but usually do not have sufficient resources for interruptions longer than about 12 
hours. Extended interruptions may have additional significant negative social effects such 
as vandalism and looting. 
• Economic – Economic impacts are clearly involved in power outages. For example, many 
factories have critical multi-staged processes in which interruption of power causes loss of 
production in an intermediate step that results in significant economic losses even for a 
short duration outage. The August 14, 2003, Blackout Report (see [NERC]) estimated 
losses from the outage to be in the range of $4 – $10 billion. Though this is an extreme 
case, and estimates are difficult, it is clear that economic costs associated with power 
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outages are significant. Even under brownout conditions, where power is not lost but loads 
are serviced at lower levels than nominal, equipment can fail and cause economic losses. 
• Political – A third type of consequence is the loss of public confidence and effects on the 
public image of a company that causes (or is perceived to have caused) a major 
interruption. 
6.3 FACTS-Specific Consequences 
The following relates the discussion above to specific considerations related to how CFDs 
operate in the context of a power system. The consequences of failures in FACTS device 
operations range from local outages and power interruptions to introducing stability problems 
into the system that could potentially lead to large-scale power interruptions. These 
consequences can result from either power system or adversarial vectors. 
• Switch Level Control (Destabilization/Deformation of Power Wave)–As discussed 
previously the switch level control involves taking dynamic control commands and 
utilizing power electronics devices (IGBT switches, inverters, etc.) as well as other power 
devices (capacitors, transformers, etc.) to modify the real and reactive power flowing on 
the line. The execution of the power electronics is through hardware. Failure of the 
devices or modifying the inputs, either of the control commands or analog inputs from the 
power line could affect the operation of these controls. Modification of the controls could 
have two different affects—the power levels could be changed or distorted waveforms 
could be introduced into the power line. In the first case, load imbalances could occur due 
to shifts in power flow to other lines when the affected CFD line flow changes. In the 
second case, distorted waveforms could create stability problems by inducing transients, 
which can trigger relay controls to open power lines, or damage equipment of end users. 
• Long Term and Dynamic Control (Damage/Tripping Caused by Incorrect Operation 
[Overloads] and Inter-Area Oscillations)–As with switch level control, affecting long-term 
and dynamic control settings would cause imbalances to occur that could shift power to 
other lines and cause overloads on the lines. Again, this could cause local outages and 
interruptions and lead to stability problems. Inter-area oscillations occur when machines 
(generators, loads, etc.) from one part of the power system oscillate against machines from 
another part of the system [Kundur]. This can result in transient ringing waveforms 
induced in the power system that through positive feedback can quickly cause major 
power stability problems. These oscillations can occur when separate CFDs react and 
respond to one another’s settings, in effect creating a competition between CFDs that 
creates ringing and feedback. Two possible ways to manage the problem are to ensure that 
all the CFDs agree on settings before changes occur and only one CFD executes local 
settings changes at any one time, but simulation and testing is required to verify this. 
• SCADA Interactions (Failure to get proper system data, incorrect FACTS settings 
transmitted)–In standalone FACTS devices, the main data between the SCADA system 
and the FACTS device are the FACTS settings and the readings of the FACTS device line. 
The SCADA operator may or may not be able to remotely control the FACTS device, 
depending upon how the device is configured and the operating procedures of the 
company. In a CFD environment, each CFD requires data for the status of the system it 
controls to execute the optimization algorithm used. If any of the SCADA data are 
compromised, if the magnitude of changes were great enough, it would affect the result of 
the optimization algorithm or cause the optimization to fail to complete, which could 
result in incorrect operations, overloads, and stability problems.  
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• FACTS Control Interactions (Failure of Cooperative Operations)–The optimization 
algorithm in a CFD environment is executed in a distributed fashion between the various 
CFDs used in the system. The CFD environment is also used to negotiate interactions 
between CFDs. If either of these functions failed or was disrupted, it could result in the 
same consequences—incorrect operations, overloads, etc. discussed above. However, if 
control of a CFD device were obtained, more direct adverse consequences would occur 
due to the direct control, whereas with other types of failures described, the consequences 
would be indirect since no direct control of devices is involved. 
6.4 Power System Consequences 
This section considers consequences that affect the power system. Power loss to a piece of 
power equipment is known as an outage; power loss to a customer is known as an 
interruption. 
• System Responds Properly – If the system is sufficiently resilient and has sufficient 
backup capacity, the failure may take the particular equipment out of service (local 
outage), but the generators and transmission systems will absorb the transient changes and 
no customer power losses (interruptions) will occur. 
• Local Interruptions Occur – The system may be sufficiently resilient, but due to the 
topography of the power system (e.g., there is only one radial feed to a particular load), 
there may be a local loss of power in an area (interruption); however, the rest of the 
system will not experience outages or stability problems.  
• Stability Problems Occur – If a critical transmission element or generator fails, there may 
initially be only a local outage and/or interruption, but the failure can lead to voltage or 
frequency stability problems as well as overloading, which linger in the system and can 
trigger more widespread outages that can eventually result in a blackout or brownout. 
• Regional Blackouts or Brownouts Occur – When an interruption occurs over a region, it is 
known as a blackout; when power is not interrupted but voltage is serviced considerably 
below nominal levels over a region, it is known as a brownout. There can be different 
sizes of regional interruptions, from areas of a particular city or regions of a state. Usually 
the term blackout or brownout is reserved for conditions of significant size, such as the 
August 10, 1996, West Coast and August 14, 2003, East Coast blackouts. 
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7 Contingency Analysis 
Power companies and control areas design their systems to anticipate the types of failures 
that can occur. Today’s power systems are expected to withstand some level of failure 
without major effects on the power system. There are limitations to what can be 
accomplished by design, as recognized by the NERC and embodied in their “N-1 criteria” 
requirement that a power system be able to provide power after the loss of any one major 
generator or transmission element.  
Analysis tools used by power operators are discussed below. Analysis of the loss of one 
generator or transmission element is a first-order contingency analysis; analysis of the loss of 
two elements is a second-order contingency analysis. Usually, no more than second-order 
analysis is performed because of the dramatically increased effort required to go further. For 
example, for a 100-node system there would be 100 first-order analyses, 9900 second-order 
analyses, and nearly a million third-order contingency analyses for each system load profile. 
It is prohibitively costly and time consuming to go beyond second-order analysis or to 
evaluate many different load profiles. 
7.1 Contingency Analysis Types 
Contingency analyses can be subdivided into long-term and real-time analysis. Long-term 
analysis is used to design the system properly and create contingency plans to respond to 
specific critical contingencies that may occur. Real-time analysis consists of utilizing many 
of the same analysis tools to estimate the state of the system and possible contingencies that 
may occur for the specific system conditions that exist at the time of the analysis. 
• Power Flow – Power flow studies examine load profiles during steady state conditions to 
ensure that under specified maximum conditions that system overloads will not occur. 
Power flow studies are also used for planning as well.  
• Short Circuit – Short circuit studies examine the impact of failures on the system such as 
the resulting current and voltage levels at the time of the failure. These studies help with 
better relay coordination, and with determining plans to mitigate particular failures. 
• Stability – Stability studies examine the short-term effects of failures on the overall power 
system. In essence, many of the analysis methods consist of obtaining a series of 
consecutive power flow snapshots over a short duration by allowing parameters to change 
as failures occur and determining how these changes propagate to other equipment. Each 
snapshot is a power flow program that factors in the effects from the previous power flow. 
Because of the complexity and computational requirements, the accuracy of these studies 
is limited to very short time durations, and only heavy load conditions with large impact 
equipment (“N-1”) are examined.  
• Voltage Drop – Voltage drop studies ensure that the system does not have inherent voltage 
drop problems in which normal expected load profiles cause voltages to be consistently 
low (or high in some cases). 
• Relay Coordination – Relay coordination studies determine that relay values are set 
properly to insert and safely remove equipment from service in a coordinated fashion with 
other relays, to prevent improper relay settings from causing failures or compromising 
safety. 
• State Estimation – State estimation consists of all the tools used to analyze the current 
state of power systems, using actual information to perform some of the above studies 
including power flow, short circuit and stability studies to determine how to respond to 
specific conditions that occur, that were not analyzed by long term studies. 
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7.2 Anatomy of Contingencies and Failures 
When a power system contingency happens, several degrees of difficulty can arise. Usually, 
system protective measures prevent problems from extending beyond the local areas where 
they first occur. When large outages do occur, however, they are based on local problems 
feeding one another to cause regional instability that, in turn, trigger a major blackout. Figure 
5 (following [Kundur]) diagrams these changes by tracking the basic transitions in various 
states that occur in power systems. 
7.2.1 Anatomy of a major regional blackout: 
local contingencies 
 lead to 
  local stability problems, outages, and interruptions 
   lead to 
    regional contingencies  
     lead to 
      additional local outages and interruptions 
       lead to 
        regional stability problems  
         lead to 
          regional cascading failures and interruptions 
The August 14, 2003, East Coast blackout is a good illustration because a clear sequence has 
been documented: local difficulties in Ohio led to a blackout affecting the Northeastern and 
Upper Midwestern US and Eastern Canada. Our primary intent in describing this is to 
illustrate the kind of sequence that leads to a major power interruption.  
• August 14 loads for the upper Midwest and East Coast, including large power transfers 
between regions, were high but not unanticipated for that time of year. 
• At 1331 (EDT), a 600 MW generator tripped. 
• At 1402, a 345 kV power line tripped. The resulting outages for these events were local. 
However, these events caused system voltages to sag slightly and inadequate system 
reserves were available to relieve the situation. This created an impending voltage stability 
problem in which increasing loads or other failures could trigger further interruptions. 
• At 1505, 1532 and 1541, three additional 345 kV lines became overloaded and physically 
sagged into trees as they lengthened due to thermal expansion. 
• From 1539 to1608, sixteen 138kV lines in northern Ohio tripped out. 
• From 1608 to1638, 508 additional generating units throughout the Midwest, East Coast 
and Canada shut down.  
• By 1700, tens of millions of people were without power; many would remain so for 
several days. 
This brief synopsis illustrates how a few relatively insignificant failures can lead to 
significant regional power losses. For further details see [NERC]. 
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Figure 5. Illustration of Power System Transitions through various Contingencies  
7.3 Natural Vectors for Power System Contingencies 
The consequence associated with a power failure is due the type of contingency that occurs. 
The causes of specific contingencies are listed below. These causes are primarily from 
natural causes—lightning, equipment failures, etc.—and can also be caused by human error. 
These natural or human-error causes are referred to as natural vectors. 
7.3.1 Normal Load Changes 
Load changes both daily and seasonally in a regular but not entirely predictable manner. 
Under ordinary circumstances, load changes do not cause problems, due to well-defined 
processes utilizing automated systems relating generation to loads, market systems to bring 
new generation on line based on price and load, and the operational practices by which 
operators manage the loads in their jurisdiction. On the other hand, unforeseen situations can 
arise due to the complexity of the system and the great number of outside influences and 
individual customer and operator decisions. Occasionally these unforeseen circumstances can 
cause contingencies. 
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7.3.2 Generator Failures 
Generators can fail due to a number of causes from mechanical failures, low voltages, and 
loss of synchronism with the system frequency. When a given generator goes out of service, 
the remaining system generators will increase output to pick up the load if there is enough 
system capacity available, but when the other generators are not co-located with the failed 
generator, the resulting power flows will be different even though the system is providing 
adequate generation. This may lead to overloaded lines in other areas. There may or may not 
be a local loss of power, depending on the topography of the system.  
7.3.3 Transmission System Failures 
Transmission system failures consist of all failures of transmission system equipment, from 
transmission lines, transformers, breakers, capacitor banks, etc., that cause equipment to go 
out of service. As with generator failures, the result will be shifting system power distribution 
and may result in local outages. 
7.3.4 Control System Failures 
Control system failures consist of all the failures associated with control of power system 
equipment. Since the control systems interact with and control the transmission and 
generation equipment, control failure can take equipment out of service or run it until it fails, 
mimicking or causing operational failure. The SCADA system is an example of a remote 
control system that can directly control large portions of the power system. Relay systems 
and local controls, such as those existing in standalone FACTS devices, are examples of local 
controls in which failures can cause equipment to fail to operate properly. 
7.4 Adversarial Vectors for Power System Contingencies 
A potential cause for all the contingencies listed in Section 7.3 is malicious intent, in which 
any of the natural vectors are purposely initiated by an adversary. The actual failures are 
identical to natural failures and the resulting consequences are the same. Malicious actions 
are referred to as adversarial vectors. 
7.4.1 Denial of Cooperative Operation 
A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is an attack on a computer system or network that causes a 
loss of service, typically the loss of network connectivity and services. A DoS is often 
accomplished by consuming the bandwidth of the target network or overloading the 
computational resources (resource exhaustion) of the target system. 
While any connected system may be vulnerable to DoS attacks, systems working 
interactively, such as CFDs, are also vulnerable to a Denial of Cooperative Operation 
(DoCO) attack. The goal of such an attack would be to interrupt some or all FACTS-to-
FACTS communication in an effort to partition or isolate the CFDs from one another. The 
affected devices would no longer receive the information from other CFDs needed to conduct 
cooperative long-term and dynamic control. An example of this kind of attack is to flood the 
information channels in a cooperative network with large numbers of inserted messages that 
are valid in form but contain nonsense or do not authenticate properly. Messages of this sort 
both consume network bandwidth and force the target system to waste computational 
resources determining that they are false.  
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7.4.2 Spoofing 
Spoofing is the unauthorized use of legitimate Identification and Authentication (I&A) data, 
however it was obtained, to mimic a subject different from the attacker. Impersonating, 
masquerading, piggybacking, and mimicking are forms of spoofing.  
A related attack known as a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack occurs when an adversary 
reads, modifies, and re-inserts network messages between two parties without either party 
knowing that the link between them has been compromised. 
If an attacker were able to successfully spoof a controller or another CFD, he could perform 
“trusted” communication sessions with a victim CFD. The victim CFD would believe it was 
communicating with the trusted source, but would actually be communicating with the 
attacker’s device. This could directly impact integrity or confidentiality. 
7.4.3 Gaining Control over a CFD or Control Device 
If an attacker were able to compromise a CFD or a control device, he could control the 
operations of the device and control or alter the messages communicated to other devices. 
This could directly impact availability, integrity, or confidentiality. This would probably be 
the most severe type of attack since the attacker would now directly control a CFD and could 
disable it, change settings, send out false readings, etc. Usually attacks of this type require 
defeating authentication methods and elevating privilege levels to be able access the 
equipment.  
7.4.4 Desynchronization and Time-Based Attacks 
A desynchronization attack is an attack against the temporal properties of systems that 
depend on synchronization for proper or accurate operation. The attacker uses some means to 
cause clocks to become desynchronized from one another, causing them to fail or operate 
improperly. 
Cryptographic systems, once desynchronized, may take a substantial amount of time to 
resynchronize. Automated software and systems maintenance tools may make complex 
decisions based on slight time differences. The algorithms that will be used by CFDs are time 
dependent. The results are driven from feedback data from other CFDs. Data could be 
invalidated and long-term results skewed by incorrect time information. 
7.4.5 Data Injection 
In a data injection attack improper control or status information is injected into a system data 
stream. The general intent is to induce incorrect operation. If an adversary gains access to a 
communication channel and understands the communication protocol, he/she may be able to 
inject false but syntactically correct data packets. Data injection attacks per se do not 
necessarily involve spoofing, masquerading, using MITM, or gaining direct control of a 
device, but these methods can be used for data injection. 
An example of a data-injection attack is the replay attack in which data is recorded and 
replayed at a later time on the same channel. If system communication protocols don’t 
include a mechanism to account for the time and/or order of the message, the system may be 
fooled into basing its data-dependent behavior on data from the past. 
7.4.6 Malware Injection 
Historically, malware (viruses, worms, trojans, etc.) has been emplaced in or targeted at well-
known widely used applications (e-mail programs, browsers, and instant messengers), 
operating systems (Linux, Windows®, MacOS®), and devices (printers, routers, desktops). 
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There is nothing to prevent the development of specific malware targeted to specific systems 
if system information is available and methods to insert the malware are discovered. Properly 
designed malware can lead to partial or complete system cooption by an adversary. 
7.4.7 Social Engineering 
Social engineering is a blanket term for all methods used by adversaries to obtain information 
about a target system by exploiting natural human trust relationships. For example, an 
adversary may pretend that he/she has network problems in an attempt to obtain information 
about the type of network equipment and configurations used by a targeted system and use 
this information to gain access to protected system functions or to carry out one of the 
previously defined attacks. 
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8 FACTS Security Analysis 
From a security perspective, a system of Cooperating FACTS Devices (CFDs) can be treated 
as any existing SCADA control system with one major distinction: CFDs incorporate 
elements of agent-based (or agent-like; see Section 5), peer-to-peer communication and 
control. The congruence of CFD systems to SCADA technology is advantageous because 
SCADA control system security is a well-researched area, and most of this research is 
applicable to CFDs. A key component of that research is the body of good SCADA practices, 
which offer many security practices that CFDs should employ. 
Conversely, the agent-based, peer-to-peer aspects of CFD system operation are not as 
thoroughly thought out; applicable commercial security technology will be less common and 
relevant capabilities are more likely to be in the research phase.  
Agent-based systems are a relatively young concept within computer science. As such, a 
number of competing methodologies, frameworks, and architectures for agent-based systems 
are under development. Although research into agent-based system security has produced 
significant relevant results, there is not yet a coherent, complete body of proven agent-based 
system security information. Therefore, a security plan for a system of CFDs may very well 
include unproven security elements based on ongoing research. 
This analysis focuses on the security requirements, vulnerabilities, and implications when 
networks of FACTS devices coordinate their control actions. We have included comments 
and observations concerning the security of individual FACTS devices when appropriate 
based on the applicability of general SCADA system security principles.  
8.1 Assumptions for this Analysis 
Security analysis in this report is based on the following assumptions pertaining to the 
communication and control devices utilized in a CFD environment.  
• CFDs communicate using IP (Internet Protocol). 
• CFD computation occurs in the context of a commercial operating environment. 
Protocols, operating systems, and communication mechanisms not consistent with these 
assumptions could easily be used. These alternatives are not specifically addressed in this 
report. Much of the report content, however, does not explicitly depend on these assumptions 
and therefore applies to such alternatives. 
8.2 Security-Related Definitions 
8.2.1 Security Element Definitions 
8.2.1.1 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is the property of a body of information that it is available to only authorized 
entities and not otherwise disclosed. The confidentiality of a piece of information is enforced 
by ensuring that every access is properly authorized. Information cannot provide 
confidentiality; confidentiality must be enforced by some mechanism designed to provide it. 
A loss of confidential information may not directly affect a system but can cause major 
problems in other ways. The released information can damage a company or individual 
through public disclosure, provide advantage to a competitor or adversary, be used as a 
means for identity theft, or be used by an adversary as a precursor to attacks on integrity and 
availability.  
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8.2.1.2 Integrity 
Integrity is the property of a body of information that it has not been altered by any 
unauthorized entity or mechanism. The integrity of a piece of information is enforced by 
ensuring that it has been changed by only authorized entities. An information system can be 
said to have integrity based on its ability to preserve the integrity of the information residing 
within it. A system’s integrity depends on the correctness and reliability of its operating 
systems, the completeness and correctness of its hardware and software, the consistency of 
its data structures and processes, and the stored data itself. In a formal security model, 
integrity is interpreted to mean protection against unauthorized modification or destruction of 
information. Integrity attacks on an infrastructure control system are usually the most severe, 
because they can involve changes of system controls and data, which can cause the 
consequences described in Section 6 and the contingencies described in Section 7. 
8.2.1.3 Availability 
Availability is the property of a body of information that it can be acquired by an authorized 
entity as needed. Mechanisms that provide availability are normally required to meet 
timeliness and reliability requirements. Infrastructure control systems and their subsidiary 
information systems must generally meet information availability requirements no less 
stringent than those of the infrastructure itself. 
8.2.1.4 Vulnerability 
A vulnerability is a weakness that can lead to unauthorized activity. Exploits are related to 
vulnerabilities in that an exploit is the utilization of a particular existent vulnerability in 
carrying out an attack; in other words, a vulnerability is a weakness that can be exploited by 
an adversary.  An attack is the series of steps taken by an attacker to achieve an unauthorized 
result using adversarial attack vectors (see Section 7.4), and may require multiple exploits to 
carry out. Vulnerabilities may reference any system element, including its information 
systems, security procedures, internal controls, or implementation [NISSG]. Note that 
vulnerabilities also exist due to normal operation, i.e., they may not be associated with any 
previously identified vector. Vulnerabilities of this sort are usually distinguished from those 
perceived during security considerations.  [SAND2] provides a description of the kinds of 
vulnerabilities that exist in process control systems, including analysis of different categories 
for data, security administration, architecture, and platforms.  
Table 4 lists the various categories of attacks that can be performed on CFD devices in a 
CFD environment mapping linking the previously discussed adversarial mechanisms to 
confidentiality, availability and integrity. 
8.2.1.5 Threat 
A threat is any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact an information 
system through denial of service and/or unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, or 
modification of data [NISSG]. 
While the general definition of a threat covers any event, including natural disasters, this 
report focuses on man-made threats. In this context, it is valuable to consider the various 
groups of people who might wish to impact the system and what they seek to gain, because 
this may suggest the means by which they hope to achieve their ends and enable risk-based 
prioritization of defense activities (see the definition of risk; Section 8.2.1.6). In order to 
analyze a threat, one must take into account the threat source, including consideration of 
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Table 4. Categories of attacks on CFD devices 
Attack 
Category 
Attack Examples 
Relative Degree of 
Difficulty 
Social Engineering 
Confidentiality 
Scanning/Web searches 
Low 
Availability Denial of Service (DoS) Medium 
Spoofing and Masquerading 
Man in the Middle (MITM) 
Data Injection 
Desynchronization/Time Based Attacks 
Replay  
Insert Virus/Worm/Trojan 
Integrity 
Gaining Control over a Device 
High 
the specific motivations and capabilities of the instigator(s) and the timetable and steps 
required to carry out the attack. Table 5, from [NIST1], lists various threat sources, their 
motives, and possible threat actions they might take to plan and execute an attack. 
8.2.1.6 Risk 
Risk is the quantification of the possibility that a particular threat will adversely affect a 
target by exploiting a particular vulnerability [NISSG].  
The following definition of risk is from [SAND1], which contains a guide for understanding 
and assessing risk from an overall system level perspective. The Risk equation is:  
R = C x T x V 
where: 
R = Risk associated with an attack and/or system/asset failure 
C = Consequence(s), the negative outcomes associated with degradation or failure of the 
system or asset(s). Consequences of an attack can be measured by loss of life, economic 
impact, loss of public confidence or other metrics 
T = Threat, the probability or likelihood that a given attack scenario with the potential to 
disrupt systems or assets and cause undesirable consequences will occur. Threats are 
characterized by their means and likelihood of occurrence 
V = Vulnerability, a weakness in the system or asset, or supporting systems or assets (e.g., 
security systems, etc.) to the threat (T) that would cause degradation or failure. 
Consequences are the outcomes of the natural or adversarial vectors (vulnerabilities) that 
create contingencies that can lead to these failures. In order to quantify overall risks, each of 
these factors must be carefully considered. [NIST1] provides additional information on risk 
management. 
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Table 5. Human Threats 
Threat Source Motivation Threat Actions 
Hacker, Cracker 
Challenge  
Ego  
Rebellion  
. Hacking  
. Social engineering  
. System intrusion, break-ins  
. Unauthorized system access  
Computer criminal  
Destruction of information  
Illegal information disclosure  
Monetary gain  
Unauthorized data alteration 
. Computer crime (e.g., cyber stalking)  
. Fraudulent act (e.g., replay, impersonation, 
interception)  
. Information bribery  
. Spoofing  
. System intrusion  
Terrorist  
Blackmail  
Destruction  
Exploitation  
Revenge  
. Bomb/Terrorism  
. Information warfare  
. System attack (e.g., distributed denial of service)  
. System penetration  
. System tampering  
Industrial espionage 
(companies, foreign 
governments, other 
government interests)  
Competitive advantage  
Economic espionage  
. Economic exploitation  
. Information theft  
. Intrusion on personal privacy  
. Social engineering  
. System penetration  
. Unauthorized system access (access to classified, 
proprietary, and/or technology-related 
information)  
Insiders (poorly trained, 
disgruntled, malicious, 
negligent, dishonest, or 
terminated employees)  
Curiosity  
Ego  
Intelligence  
Monetary gain  
Revenge  
Unintentional errors and 
omissions (e.g., data entry 
error, programming error)  
. Assault on an employee  
. Blackmail  
. Browsing of proprietary information  
. Computer abuse  
. Fraud and theft  
. Information bribery  
. Input of falsified, corrupted data  
. Interception  
. Malicious code (e.g., virus, logic bomb, Trojan 
horse)  
. Sale of personal information  
. System bugs  
. System intrusion  
. System sabotage  
. Unauthorized system access  
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8.2.2 Network type definitions 
8.2.2.1 Client/Server 
In a client/server architecture, the server’s role is to accept client connections while a client’s 
role is to connect to servers when necessary to provide or acquire information (See Figure 6). 
8.2.2.2 Peer-to-Peer (P2P) 
A peer-to-peer network is a network in which every participant acts as both a client and a 
server and participants share information about known peers (See Figure 7). This type of 
network can provide a much more robust organization than the client/server model. With 
every peer being a server, the network is significantly less centralized, and no one server acts 
as a communications backbone. In a well-connected P2P network, every peer is capable of 
communicating with any other, whether directly or through one or more intermediary peers. 
8.3 A System of Cooperating FACTS Devices as a Target of Evaluation 
The Common Criteria is a standard for “specifying and evaluating the security features of 
computer products and systems [Abrams].” This reference has been selected specifically 
because it describes an “investigation of an innovative application of the Common Criteria 
(1999) in research and development, rather than acquisition.”  
Strictly speaking, a system of CFDs cannot be evaluated as a security target because the CFD 
system does not have a protective function and does not offer a protection profile. A CFD 
system fit for use in modern cyberspace, on the other hand, would necessarily have protective 
functionality and would permit the derivation of a protection profile. The Common Criteria, 
in particular as utilized in [Abrams], offers a standard, well-thought-out process for 
considering a system from a security point of view. In addition, Abrams provides “an 
approach to countermeasures characterization derived from the Common Criteria.” A 
Common-Criteria-based approach to security, though involved, would provide a solid basis 
for communication with any government entities of interest and has a measure of 
international acceptance. 
These comments about the Common Criteria and references to [Abrams] are included to 
illustrate the involved nature of a comprehensive security plan. 
In addition, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has produced a 
specific system protection profile for industrial control systems, [NIST2], that has been 
specified from the generic requirements in the Common Criteria. It includes an integrated set 
of security requirements for operating policies and procedures; technology-based system 
components, interfaces and interoperability; and physical security. Many of the rules defined 
in the security functional requirements section of [NIST2] could be applied to a CFD system 
to produce good security policies, procedures and implementation guidelines. Both [Abrams] 
and [NIST2] follow the framework briefly described in the remainder of this section to 
delineate requirements for security. 
8.3.1.1 Target of Evaluation (TOE) 
The Target of Evaluation is the system whose security properties are under evaluation. The 
TOE section of a Common Criteria evaluation describes the system and defines the scope of 
its operation. 
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8.3.1.2 TOE Security Functions (TSF) 
The security functions of a Target of Evaluation are the set of all the hardware, software, and 
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TOE 
Security Policy (TSP) and definitions of the functional requirements to secure each of these. 
8.3.1.3 TOE Security Policy (TSP) 
The security policy of a Target of Evaluation is the set of rules that regulate how assets are 
managed, protected, and distributed within the Target of Evaluation, and methods to audit, 
measure, enforce or otherwise ensure that security is maintained.  
8.4 FACTS Information Assets 
This analysis focuses on the security requirements, vulnerabilities, and implications when 
networks of FACTS devices coordinate their control actions. Although we have included 
comments and observations concerning the security of individual FACTS devices, the novel 
aspects of the FACTS research being done at University of Missouri/Rolla concern 
cooperating FACTS devices. The primary vulnerability of cooperating entities is their 
communication in establishing common goals and plans and exchanging state data. 
Therefore, this analysis focuses on the information being exchanged by FACTS devices over 
a communication network. Table 6 below shows the types of information exchanged in a 
CFD environment and described below. 
Table 6. Types of information exchange in a CFD Environment 
Information Type Description Where Used 
Data (Remote) Data used to execute distributed 
max flow algorithm 
System Status Input from SCADA 
System; Algorithm processing in 
each CFD; Data sent between CFDs 
to complete optimization algorithm 
Data (Local) CFD local monitoring and 
setpoint execution 
Locally between CFD and Power 
line it controls 
Control Settings Human inputs to CFDs such as 
parameter values, policies, or 
direct commands 
Remote or Local inputs to individual 
CFDs 
CFD Control – 
Status  
Current status of CFD, (e.g. in 
service, out of service, standby) 
Internal to each CFD & traffic 
between CFDs 
CFD Control – 
Setpoint Plan 
Agreed upon plan to change 
setpoints in CFD environment 
Internal to each CFD & traffic 
between CFDs 
CFD Control – 
Setpoint Execution 
Acknowledgment that setpoints 
have been executed in each CFD 
Internal to each CFD & traffic 
between CFDs 
Program Code Distributed programming to 
compute optimization algorithm 
Internal to each CFD 
Identity and 
Authentication 
Tokens and method to 
authenticate CFD as well as 
fixed ID info 
Internal to each CFD & traffic 
between CFDs 
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Cooperative FACTS-based control and management of an electric power network requires 
these primary information elements: 
1. Data concerning electrical phenomena 
a. Local data about the branch assigned to a FACTS device coming directly into the 
device from dedicated sensors. 
b. Remote data about parts of a network for which a FACTS device has no direct sensors 
coming into the device from a SCADA system or other information distribution. This 
data are received through a communications network. 
2. Control settings from human operators. This information is typically received through a 
communications network. 
a. Commands 
b. Parameter values 
c. Policy 
3. Communication among FACTS devices needed to effect long-term control. 
This item differs conceptually from 1b in that “remote data” refers to grid information 
exclusive of FACTS devices and not necessarily having anything to do with long-term 
control, whereas this item—“3. Communication among FACTS devices …”—is 
concerned with information from other FACTS devices specifically for CFD system long-
term control. This includes information pertaining to the states of various system 
processes and components: communication, computational, and security processes; cyber 
events such as attacks and network outages; the utility SCADA system, if any; and the 
FACTS devices themselves. 
4. Executable computer program code 
5. Identity information about each device. This information is unique to each FACTS device 
and helps both other FACTS devices and human operators identify and work with the 
device for authentication during cooperative interactions. This may include: 
a. Network IDs, such as MAC addresses and IP addresses 
b. Serial & model numbers 
c. Firmware and software versions 
d. Hardware identification, profiles, and capabilities 
e. Credentials such as certificates, cryptographic keys, etc. 
8.5 Inherited SCADA Security 
A distributed FACTS control system is likely to utilize an existing SCADA system for inter-
CFD communication, and, if so, will inherit security attributes from its SCADA roots. These 
include communications, control architectures, vulnerabilities, and more. However, due to 
the extensive body of research covering SCADA systems security, distributed FACTS 
control systems can also use a wealth of existing security “best practice.” 
8.5.1 Physical Layer Communications 
A distributed FACTS control system relies heavily on communications networks and 
architectures to enable long-term control of the power grid. Since each FACTS device 
individually makes changes on time intervals ranging from microseconds to seconds, timely 
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delivery of accurate, trustworthy data from peer devices and SCADA controllers are 
essential. Therefore, security of the FACTS communication network is vital to operational 
success of the distributed control system. 
The physical layer of the network transmits information both among FACTS nodes and 
between SCADA control systems and the FACTS nodes. A variety of physical networks can 
support this capability at varying costs. However, each option carries known security 
protections and risks. 
SCADA security guidelines suggest that control systems should be located on closed 
networks. However, we will discuss a variety of options in order to highlight the risks of 
physical layer choices. 
8.5.1.1 Open Network (e.g., the Internet) 
Open networks, like the Internet, offer any distributed information system a large level 
connectivity for a low price. Broadband connections are readily available and very cheap. 
However, direct connections to the Internet are notoriously insecure.  
All traffic into and out of the connection is visible to third parties and is often logged by 
intermediate service providers. Because of the dynamic nature of routing protocols, the path 
of connectivity between any two nodes is not guaranteed. As a result, neither quality of 
service nor throughput is guaranteed. All nodes on the Internet are vulnerable to directed 
DoS or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. All nodes may also be adversely 
affected by the second-order effects of DoS/DDoS attacks on other systems on the Internet. 
CFDs are not just a distributed information system, but also a control system for the power 
grid. Because of the critical importance of the power grid to the nation’s infrastructure, CFDs 
should not communicate in an unprotected manner over the open Internet. 
8.5.1.2 Closed Network 
Closed private networks offer some advantages over the open Internet. Routers and other 
network equipment can be configured to prioritize network traffic, establish quality of 
service, and create static routes between nodes. A closed network is usually more secure than 
the Internet itself, but it is only as secure as the weakest link in the network. For example, a 
closed SCADA network connected to a local-access network corporate (LAN) is no more 
secure than the corporate LAN. Nodes in a closed network may still be compromised by 
accessing the hardware physically instead of remotely. Finally, closed networks can be 
substantially more expensive to deploy than using the open Internet. 
Most power companies have already deployed or are deploying fiber-optic connections to 
their substations. These networks may be closed or, at a minimum, segregated from the 
Internet and corporate LANs. Provided that enough bandwidth capacity is available on these 
networks, they may be a reduced cost network option for cooperating FACTS deployments 
8.5.1.3 Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) offer a middle ground between open and closed networks. 
A VPN uses open networks to send data between nodes, but secures the data using strong 
encryption to provide confidentiality, prevent network penetration by attackers, and generally 
reduce the effectiveness of network reconnaissance. However, VPNs are vulnerable to first- 
and second-order DoS/DDoS attacks and are only as secure as the weakest link that possesses 
the encryption key. The primary advantage of the VPN is the cost savings of using open 
networks rather than building and maintaining a closed network. 
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8.5.1.4 RF Communication 
Currently, local and regional control centers use microwave communications equipment to 
control substation equipment. Microwave communications operate in the frequency range 
between 1 GHz and 300 GHz. This communication is primarily one-way, with substation 
equipment receiving commands from control centers. This simplifies the communication bus 
because only the control center can send information. 
Communication among CFDs would require transmission capability for each device on the 
network. Furthermore, an arbitration algorithm (TDMA, CDMA, GPRS, etc.) would have to 
be deployed so that each CFD had a designated “space” for its messages. It is possible that 
the increased overhead of arbitration and the transmission needs of the CFDs would not fit 
into the current digital throughput constraints of microwave communications as used by 
power companies. 
8.5.1.5 Power Line Communication (PLC) 
Power line communication systems use electrical wiring to transmit information. They are 
already in use and power system operators are already familiar with their operation. These 
systems have various incarnations: home automation, automatic meter reading, control 
systems for switches and transformers, and broadband over power lines (BPL). 
Home automation and automatic meter reading systems typically operate at the local 
distribution leg. They offer low bandwidth and low throughput communications in the 20–
200 kHz frequency range.16 
Long-haul communication systems are used to control and monitor switches, transformers, 
and other electrical equipment. These systems operate in the 30–300 kHz frequency range, 
and are increasingly used as backups or when microwave (RF) or fiber optic communications 
are unavailable. The data throughput may not be sufficient for a distributed, agent based 
system, especially when it employs peer-to-peer communication. 
8.5.2 Control Architecture 
8.5.2.1 SCADA-based Client-Server (Centralized) 
The networking capability that allows CFDs to cooperate can also allow for direct 
communication between CFDs and SCADA Human-Machine Interface (HMI) workstations. 
Using this feature, FACTS devices could be fed information from a user, request information 
from other automated devices on the SCADA network, or be configured remotely. As with 
all remotely configurable SCADA devices, secure authentication and information 
certification are primary security concerns. Figure 6 shows the general client-server 
relationships. Note that the clients do not communicate directly with one another. 
8.5.2.2 Multi-Tier (Hierarchical) 
This is similar to the client-server case above, but instead of one-on-one communication 
between a user and each CFD, the user communicates with intermediary devices, each of 
which communicates with a group of CFDs on the user’s behalf. The goal of reducing the 
amount of direct interaction between the user and the CFDs is to increase efficiency, with the 
user configuring or sending data to whole groups of CFDs at once. Security concerns are the 
same as those for the client-server architecture. The major flaw in this architecture is that the 
intermediaries are points of communication failure for whole groups of CFDs. 
                                                
16 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_line_communication 
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Figure 6. The Client-Server Architecture has a central information 
source, i.e., the server 
8.6 Vulnerabilities 
This section describes particular vulnerabilities associated with a CFD environment due to 
the cooperative peer-to-peer nature of the CFD environment. This supplements the material 
in Section 7.4 on adversarial vectors and vulnerabilities.  
8.6.1 Operating System and Application Vulnerabilities 
A CFD can be impacted by vulnerabilities in its host operating system. Operating system 
vulnerability concerns are the same as those for any network-connected device running that 
operating system. Programming errors or oversights in the design, implementation, or 
configuration of any application running on a CFD could introduce additional vulnerabilities.  
8.6.2 Timing Errors/Induced Delays 
The distributed FACTS control system depends greatly on the timely delivery of accurate 
information. Dynamic control makes control decisions on the order of microseconds, while 
long-term control operates on the order of minutes. Compared to human operators, both of 
these time intervals are very quick and enable the FACTS devices to respond quickly to 
changing conditions. Relative to computer processing cycles, these intervals are slow, thus 
enabling intelligent processing before decisions are made. However, relative to networks, 
dynamic control operates at the same speed, while long-term control is slower. Therefore, 
network performance, timing, and the results of network-based attack can impact the 
operation of dynamic control. Since long-term control uses dynamic control results as an 
input, these network issues may also have second-order effects on long-term control. 
8.6.2.1 Network Time 
CFDs depend on technology to keep electronic clocks and timestamps synchronized across 
the network. In addition to CFD operation, accurate time synchronization is vital to many 
security functions, such as secure authentication and activity logging. For network-based 
time synchronization to achieve secure operation, it must accomplish two objectives: first, 
the server must authenticate itself to the client; second, it must not be possible for an 
adversary to replay synchronization messages, thereby setting a local clock back by an 
arbitrary amount. 
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The most common time synchronization technology in use over IP networks is the Network 
Time Protocol (NTP). Research on distributed systems using unpoliced, standard 
implementations of NTP (See, for example, [Bishop]) has showed that insertion of a rogue 
time server can drift the clocks between systems by seconds, minutes, hours, or days. 
Another approach is to use time synchronization broadcasts, such as the NIST WWV 
broadcast or GPS signals. These signals can be spoofed but require the attacker choose an 
appropriate location. Should NTP exploitation techniques be discovered, the physical 
location of the adversary might be less constrained. A good practice is to have multiple 
sources for time synchronization information. 
8.6.3 Code Revision/Replacement 
FACTS devices incorporate complex computers that run binary instructions, whether stored 
on a hard disk, flash memory, or a programmable chip. An attacker that can knowledgeably 
modify those instructions can bypass any built-in local algorithms (e.g., dynamic control) and 
safeguards and take full control of the device. Then, by maliciously coordinating with other 
FACTS devices, the attacker can affect the long-term control algorithms being executed by 
the CFD group, thereby impacting a larger section of the power grid. The complexity of this 
attack is admittedly high, but so is the potential risk to the power grid. 
8.6.4 Trust Manipulation 
Each FACTS device acts as an individual node in a distributed information system that 
operates according to an implicit trust model. Trust is implicit in that proper operation of the 
long-term and dynamic control algorithms assumes trustworthy data from peer devices and 
authentic commands from any higher-level controllers. In a research setting, the trust model 
can be ignored while refining the functionality of the network. However, in a live critical 
deployment, vulnerabilities in the trust model can lead to outsider or insider attacks. 
For example, a simple attack on a trust model is the MITM attack. In a cooperative FACTS 
deployment, neighboring devices A, B, and C might trust data from one another and use an 
IP table for one another’s addresses. An attacker sees the frequent network traffic between 
these nodes and recognizes the trust relationship. The attacker floods device C with bogus 
network traffic, denying service to C and disabling C’s ability to respond to A and B. The 
attacker then spoofs device C’s IP address and sends malicious data to devices A and B. As a 
result, the long-term control algorithms from devices A and B start responding to the 
malicious data and begin sending power level adjustments to dynamic control. Device C 
receives the changes from A and B, and begins its own adjustments. However, C is unable to 
send out its current state. The attackers continue sending malicious data, and the negative 
feedback cycle continues until one or more of the power lines controlled by A, B, and C 
reaches its limit and overloads. The overload may cascade into the regional power grid. 
8.7 Good Security Practices 
8.7.1 Firewalls 
Host-based firewalls should be installed on every networked FACTS device to help prevent 
potential attacks from within the device’s local network. Networked devices should be 
divided into security zones based on security requirements. A network firewall should be set 
up at the entrance to any given security zone to create a combined front line for a group of 
devices requiring the same level of protection and to minimize the threat of attacks from 
outside the security zone. 
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8.7.2 Access Control Lists (ACLs) 
Access Control Lists (ACLs) should be used to limit communication originating at and 
destined for FACTS devices to only the routes necessary for proper FACTS communication. 
FACTS devices should be allowed to communicate directly only with SCADA 
administrative computers and other FACTS devices. A sophisticated but growing concept is 
network enclaves, in which the data and functions of a system are grouped into enclaves and 
segmented from one another by the use of subnets, VLANs, VPNs, firewalls etc. Access 
Control Lists are used to disallow traffic without the proper credentials attempting to enter 
the enclave. 
8.7.3 Intrusion Detection 
Passive intrusion detection should be used on each FACTS device host and at the entrance to 
each FACTS security zone. These systems should be configured so that they do not alter the 
flow of traffic to and from the FACTS devices under any circumstances. 
8.7.4 Authentication 
Remote administration of FACTS devices should be designed to require login using exactly 
one unique username and strong password per user. All remote login accounts should be set 
to allow the user the minimum level of privilege necessary to do his/her job. The 
authentication system should incorporate access control protocols that allow users with 
different levels of authority to have different levels of access. The system should also allow 
the authority/access level of a user to be changed according to the user’s assigned duties. 
8.7.5 Logging 
Logging should be done using a scalable logging subsystem designed to prevent flood attacks 
on the logging system itself. In addition to providing possible indicators that an attack is 
occurring, logging also provides an audit trail to clean up after attacks or system failures. 
8.7.6 Tamper Prevention 
Executable program code should be signed using certificates and/or multi-factor 
authentication. This should be combined with tamper-proof seals and other physical 
countermeasures that disable in-person changes to the device by unauthorized users (See 
Section 8.8.3, Multiparty Strategies). 
8.7.7 Encryption 
Encryption protects the confidentiality of data by encoding the data in such a way that only 
the intended recipient can decode it. The original, unencrypted data is referred to as plaintext 
or cleartext, and the encrypted data as ciphertext. Encryption can assist in providing data 
integrity and authentication, but not without additional measures such as error checking and 
secure key attribution. Encryption, and for that matter any function of any information 
security system, can be subverted by exploiting weaknesses in the protocols by which 
encryption keys are generated and transmitted, messages are queued for encryption, etc. 
8.7.8 Integrity Checking 
Integrity checking involves all the methods used to verify the integrity of data messages, 
such as CRCs, one-way hash functions, digital signatures etc. This can also include more 
esoteric methods such as biometrics and multi-factor authentication. 
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8.7.9 Configuration Management 
Configuration management applies to both control system and network equipment. 
Configuration management allows one to trace configuration changes, which can be used to 
trace out the integrity of the system.  
8.7.10 Non-Repudiation 
Non-repudiation means, essentially, undeniability. In information systems, the term normally 
refers to the quality of a message by which an encryptor cannot deny having encrypted it and 
a decryptor cannot deny having decrypted it. Non-repudiation depends on authentication 
being in place, and can be used for accountability and identifying a message’s source for 
fault isolation and information forensics. 
8.7.11 Redundancy 
Redundancy includes incorporating additional backup systems (preferably operated in “hot 
standby,” in which they immediately take over without interruption when a primary system 
fails) and backup paths for data to flow to anticipate failures. Redundancy can also be applied 
to security with the notion of “defense in depth” in which a system is designed such that the 
breach of any one layer of security cannot compromise the system. 
8.8 Agent-Based Security 
8.8.1 Control Architectures for Agent-Based Operation 
8.8.1.1 Peer-to-Peer (Autonomous) Control 
A CFD needs significant information about the power grid when making its decisions. Peer-
to-peer communication, in which CFDs throughout the power grid inform one another of 
changing situations, allows this information to be communicated directly from one FACTS 
device to another. Figure 7 shows the notional peer-to-peer architecture: system components 
communicate with one another directly with no need for a central server.  
 
 
Figure 7. The Peer-to-Peer Architecture has no central information source; 
devices can get data only from one another. 
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Peer-to-peer communication requires a notoriously high amount of bandwidth, so 
implementers must take care to ensure that the CFDs do not overwhelm the network. One 
way this might be accomplished would be to partition the peer-to-peer network into 
hierarchical communication zones based on proximity, minimizing unnecessary 
communication.  
When agents operate independently in a peer-to-peer network, it is vital that they be able to 
trust the information on which their decisions are based. Therefore, a robust mechanism must 
be in place to ensure trusted communication. 
8.8.1.2 Mixed-Mode Control 
In this architecture, CFDs interact cooperatively as in the peer-to-peer architecture, but a user 
has the capability to send data or directives to some or all CFDs. This provides all the 
advantages of peer-to-peer communication, but with a degree of human supervision. Security 
concerns are a combination of those of the peer-to-peer architecture and of either the client-
server architecture or the multi-tier architecture, depending on how user control is 
implemented. 
8.8.2 Security-Oriented System Behavior 
With respect to security, the response or reactive behavior of CFDs can be modeled at a high 
level by a state table. This generalization would apply to each expected information asset 
interaction between CFDs. Because the exact sensory data, deployment architecture, 
communication system, and level of peer verification are unknown and may vary by 
institutional rollout, a pre-determined global state table is neither feasible nor effective. 
Table 7 enumerates the set of reporting behaviors and serves as an example of the analysis 
required for each cooperative exchange. An individual FACTS device that is part of the 
cooperative network expects a behavior from a peer or group of peers. That expectation 
could be the result of its own current state, a message from the peer devices, a routine 
process, an authoritative command, or even a joint calculation such as Max Flow. The 
individual FACTS device also perceives some behavior through its local sensors, remote 
sensors obtained from the SCADA system, peer messages, and/or data from other 
authoritative source such as human operators. Sometimes the expectations and perceptions 
match up; sometimes they do not. This kind of logically complete analysis enables the 
FACTS device to act appropriately—that is, according to policy—in all circumstances. 
Table 7. Enumeration of Reporting Possibilities 
CFD 
Behavior: 
CFD 
reports: 
Other sources 
report: 
Analysis 
O O O All sources are reporting correctly 
O X O The CFD is reporting incorrectly 
O O X Other sources are reporting incorrectly 
O X X All sources are reporting incorrectly. 
 
This table demonstrates the unpleasant notion that accurate reporting cannot be taken for 
granted in any of these cases. For example, the first row and the fourth row are 
indistinguishable to the observer (in both cases all sources agree), except the system is not 
performing as advertised in the forth row. In order to decide how to respond, in each case the 
situation must be evaluated against the implemented definitions of trust and results of 
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decisions about which reports should be considered trustworthy. Even in cases without 
conflict, likely the most common case, it cannot be assured that what is reported is what 
occurred. The most important recommendations based on this table are the following: 
1. Deploy the CFD environment with CFD algorithms that incorporate measures to detect 
internal conflict about an information element’s truth value, and 
2. When there is such a conflict, respond immediately, according to a specified policy, to 
stop any ongoing damage, prevent using corrupted data (if any), and take appropriate 
action with respect to any improper or malicious activity in progress. 
The specific policy should indicate what action is to be taken in response to unexpected 
events that affect security. Possible responses include, but are not limited to: 
• Record the unexpected behavior and continue standard operation 
• Raise an alarm 
• Send commands to shut down or restart the suspect device  
• Shunt communications around the suspect device 
• Stop responding to communications from the suspect device 
• Ignore all communication from the suspect device  
• Do not trust information coming from the suspect device 
• Do not trust information from any device 
These policies would have to be developed based on an analysis of potential attacks and 
failure modes that could occur. A risk analysis should also be performed to rank the possible 
events on a likelihood scale so security policy implementation can be designed to respond 
most effectively to the riskiest attacks and failure modes. A more comprehensive analysis 
would look at the various types of adversarial vectors as listed in Table 4 (and further 
discussed for peer-to-peer CFD environments) coupled with the types of information 
exchange in a CFD environment listed in Table 6. An analysis could then be done for each 
type of communication to compare the consequences and impacts of the adversarial vectors 
that could disrupt the CFD environment. With this analysis in hand, policies could be 
constructed to anticipate and provide remediation for the contingencies it contains.  
Figure 8 supplements Figure 2 in illustrating the locations of vulnerabilities in a CFD 
environment. The sections below on multiparty and agent-based strategies provide further 
discussion of what constitute good security policies for a CFD environment. 
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Figure 8. Location of Vulnerabilities in a CFD Environment 
 
8.8.3 Multiparty Strategies 
Failures that can be traced to human activity are often the result of a malicious act carried out 
in secret by a lone perpetrator or an error by a single individual. The likelihood of such 
failures would be reduced if more than one individual were required to participate. If any 
involved party did not want to proceed, he/she could stop the activity by withholding assent. 
Techniques that require participation by two or more individuals for successful execution are 
called multiparty techniques. Cryptographically implemented multiparty techniques are not 
explicitly agent-based, but are very complex, so that something like an artificial social 
system—such as an agent society—is helpful in implementing a system that executes them.  
Multiparty techniques are used when the risk of negative consequence due to unauthorized 
unilateral execution is large. A familiar multiparty technique has been portrayed in many 
movies: In order to launch a nuclear missile, two keys must be inserted into two locks located 
several feet apart and turned simultaneously by two different individuals. This prevents 
launch by any single adversary. On the other hand, if either party does not act, for whatever 
reason, the missile cannot be launched, because even an authorized player can’t do it alone. 
For some multiparty cryptographic protocols (see, for example, [Goldwasser]), generating 
authorization requires at least n of m players, with n and m chosen to provide failure and 
threshold properties. For example, n less than m allows execution even when up to m-n 
players abstain. The mechanism allows variation in n and m. The players would signify their 
willingness to authorize by interacting with a digital system (say, by entering their PINs). 
The complex mathematics requires a computer, which is also useful for keeping track of the 
state of the protocol. This again suggests (although it does not dictate) the use of agents.  
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For instance, suppose policymakers decide that at least three of five system administrators 
must be present when software is being installed. Multiparty authorization could be set up 
with, say, n being three and m being five, i.e., at least three administrators are needed to 
generate authorization to install. This technology-backed policy is intended to prevent any 
one or two individuals—in particular, malicious insiders—from installing software. 
8.8.4 Agent-Based Mitigation Strategies 
8.8.4.1 Fail-Safe Mode 
Under various circumstances, an individual FACTS device may engage in a fail-safe mode of 
operation. Since FACTS devices are already operating in the field without cooperative 
behavior, an effective fail-safe option is to revert to standalone operation. This provides extra 
protection for the cooperative network because individual units can cease cooperation at any 
time to preserve their portion of the power grid. 
Various circumstances that may require fail-safe operation include: 
• Communications network failure 
• Intrusion detection 
• Safe mode command from an authorized controller 
• Trust failure between cooperative peers 
8.8.4.2 Manual Override 
In the event a FACTS device requires maintenance, authorized personnel should be able to 
override cooperative behavior and force safe operation while upgrades and repairs are 
performed. This is to minimize risk both to the maintenance personnel as well as the 
electrical transmission network. 
Any override mode carries the risk that it might be used maliciously by unauthorized 
attackers. This risk can be minimized by enforcing multifactor authorization; e.g., a CFD 
entering maintenance mode only when it receives a command from a trusted source and is 
presented with a local authorization credential such as a physical or electronic key. 
8.9 Network Situational Awareness and Visualization 
A powerful and important mitigation strategy against failure and attack of all types is to 
maintain a level of situational awareness at all times. This is accomplished by maintaining 
the state of a detailed model of the system of interest that reflects the current state of the real 
system. It is usually of interest that the system state reflected in the model not lag too far 
behind the actual system state. The amount of lag permitted depends on many factors. 
Components are connected into larger networked systems that can exhibit collective 
behaviors not apparent from analysis of the individual parts. These emergent behaviors may 
be beneficial but can also create instabilities. The Sandia National Laboratories Center for 
Cyber Defenders has developed a prototype tool for the Analysis and Visualization of the 
Emergent Behavior of Distributed Intelligent Autonomous Systems (AnVEBIDAS) [Miller] 
that provides a generic agent framework and a number of visualization tools. The intent of 
this tool is not to automate the detection and classification of emergent behaviors, but rather 
to serve as a platform to visualize potential problems and the impact of system modifications. 
AnVEBIDAS has been applied to specific power grid scenarios (Figure 9 and Figure 10). We 
recommend that visualization technology be applied to the network communication system 
as well as the distributed power network. 
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Figure 9. AnVEBIDAS screen showing the state of the IEEE 118-bus system 
 
Figure 10. Detail of the AnVEBIDAS view of the IEEE 118-bus system 
  65
8.10 Security Documentation 
8.10.1 Security Policy 
8.10.1.1 Security Policy Elements 
References [SAND3] and [SAND5] provide a framework for developing security policies for 
a control system. Figure 11, taken from [SAND5], illustrates the key elements of a 
comprehensive SCADA system security policy that includes elements for the different 
categories of a system that require policies for security.  
[Fraser] provides an additional source for formulating cyber security policy. This document 
motivates the existence of a security policy and discusses its relationship to the security plan, 
the participants in its formulation, and key tradeoffs. The document recommends that 
security policy be implementable and enforceable using security tools and sanctions and that 
it clearly define the areas of responsibility for the users, administrators, and management.  
According to [Fraser] the components of a good security policy include computer technology 
purchasing guidelines, a privacy policy, an access policy, an accountability policy, an 
authentication policy, an availability statement, an information technology system and 
network maintenance policy, a violations reporting policy, and supporting information that 
provides users, staff, and management with contact information for each type of policy 
violation and guidelines on how to handle outside queries about a security incident. 
The authors recommend [Fraser] to anyone considering the acquisition or development of a 
security system; for novices it provides a straightforward and comprehensive guide and for 
experts a well-thought-out checklist and sanity check. 
8.10.1.2 Guidelines for Writing Security Policy for CFDs 
Every SCADA system must have a security policy in place. A good security policy is a code 
of standards and behavior with minimal reference to technology and no references to specific 
technologies; it should be able to survive major organizational overhauls with little or no 
revision. Installation of new technology should lead only to security policy revision in the 
extremely rare cases in which the new technology introduces to the system a new form of 
behavior that has yet to be codified in the policy document; in the case of CFDs, agent 
behavior may qualify (depending on its implementation). 
Specific guidelines for how to apply the security policy in a practical manner should be 
addressed in the more specific security documents discussed in Section 8.10.2. 
8.10.1.3 Agent-Based Security Policy 
An agent-based security policy for CFDs is very similar to the SCADA security policy, but 
focused particularly on agent-level interaction, which is expected to be peer to peer. The 
included policies would represent a formalization of the state analysis performed using the 
technique identified in Section 7.5.3 in addition to any multi-party and mitigation strategies. 
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Figure 11. Sandia National Laboratories Security Policy Framework 
 
8.10.2 Other Important Security Documentation 
Like other components in the SCADA network, CFDs must be addressed in the network 
security documentation. While security policy is meant as an unspecific, relatively static 
guideline to secure operation for a system in general, there should be three other sets of 
security documents that are both more mutable and more detailed, and therefore certainly in 
need of amending to accommodate CFDs: the security plan, which applies the guidelines laid 
out in the security policy to the specific architecture of the network at hand; the 
implementation guides, which provide specific instructions for installing, configuring, and 
maintaining the specific system components; and the procedures document, which 
documents appropriate behavior for repeatable situations. 
Because these three types of documentation must be custom-written for a given system, and 
because there are still many details missing with regard to CFD implementation, we can give 
very little guidance as to how these documents must be modified to include CFDs. As agent 
behavior is the only factor that differentiates CFDs from typical networked SCADA devices, 
most of the changes to the documentation will be those that are typical for adding any new 
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networked devices to the system; therefore, our discussion was confined to changes that may 
be brought about as a result of the agent-based nature of the system. Figure 12, taken from 
[SAND3], illustrates the relationships between the IT business network framework, site 
security policy, the security plan, and system implementation, and how they relate to various 
personnel managing different aspects of the control systems.  
Figure 12. Relationships within the Security Administration Hierarchy 
8.10.2.1 Security Plan 
The security plan should apply the directives set forth in the policy to the types of 
components and behaviors known to be prevalent in the system. To modify the security plan 
to accommodate agent behavior, an organization must consider the potential for any installed 
agent’s behavior to violate policy. This means studying the agent system’s specifications and 
implementation and deciding which, if any, actions could result in a violation of policy. 
An example of an appropriate security plan modification to accommodate agent behavior 
would be a stipulation specifying guidelines for logging of agent behavior in CFDs, thereby 
satisfying logging requirements that should be present in any security policy. 
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8.10.2.2 Implementation Guides 
Implementation guides are normally very specific, requiring details such as make, model, 
version, and even firmware revision. The scope of an implementation guide should be the 
specific details of installation, configuration, maintenance, and removal. To account for agent 
behavior, implementation guides for CFDs should include details on appropriate agent 
configuration and instructions for installing, uninstalling, and upgrading agent software. 
Further, implementation guides for other network hardware and software may need to be 
modified to guarantee safe interaction with agent software. 
8.10.2.3 Procedures 
Procedures provide SCADA staff with a set of possible situations and appropriate responses 
to those situations. SCADA systems that include CFDs must be prepared with a set of 
procedures for agent misbehavior. Section 7.5 is a useful guide for potential situations of 
agent misbehavior, but guidelines for responding to these situations are very specific to the 
needs and priorities of a given organization and its SCADA system architecture. Like 
implementation guides, procedures must be extremely detailed and unambiguous, walking 
users through meticulous steps that were written specifically for the models and versions of 
hardware and software in the actual system. A different set of specific policies and 
procedures will also need to be implemented into the actual software code that executes the 
optimization algorithms to carry out setpoint changes and the cooperative agent interactions 
needed to carry out these procedures based on the security-oriented system behavior analysis 
discussed previously. So there will be a combination of procedures for monitoring, auditing 
and accessing particular CFDs in a CFD environment, and procedures implemented in the 
CFD software to respond to failures and potential attacks in real time. 
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9 Conclusions 
This report considers the operational and security aspects of implementing cooperating 
FACTS devices (CFDs) utilized in an electric power system network (CFD environment). 
The first portion of the report addressed the operational aspects of a CFD environment and 
the second portion addressed the security considerations involved with a CFD environment.  
The development of a CFD environment presents an opportunity to address the challenges 
posed by changes that power systems have undergone in recent years. Historically power 
systems have been physically and operationally isolated systems with few interconnections 
outside their own system. Power companies and regional organizations have been historically 
focused on reliability and cost issues. Security issues have become a new critically important 
issue for the following reasons:  
• Power systems are becoming increasingly interdependent and interlinked 
• Power systems need to manage changes brought by deregulation and open markets for 
generation as well as new regulations being developed by NERC and FERC following the 
August 14, 2003 blackout 
• Power systems need to be able to adapt and respond to increasingly stressed systems with 
more limited opportunities for installing generation and transmission posed by costs and 
environmental and social concerns 
• In addition, with advances in information technology the associated control systems 
associated with power systems have become increasingly automated and interlinked – 
legacy systems are increasingly being converted to COTS/internet based systems 
• A wider group of people can access the cyber controls of these systems 
• As a result of these changes, plus an explosion of hacker and terrorist threats on IT based 
systems, new vulnerabilities and risks now exist to CI’s utilizing control systems 
• Awareness, incorporation of new security practices, standards and technological 
developments must be implemented to mitigate these vulnerabilities 
Due to these factors, the implementation and use of CFDs in a power system poses new 
opportunities for addressing these challenges.  
Two approaches that appear to be particularly relevant are agent-based management and 
improved visualization. Both are responsive to modern power system concerns and could 
have made a difference in large contingencies on record. Agent technology provides a 
framework for cooperative distributed operation and modern visualization technology 
provides a more comprehensive and widely shared understanding of the state of the system. 
Together these enable better situation awareness, faster response time, and more appropriate 
response to contingencies. In addition, both technologies complement and enhance 
standalone and cooperative FACTS operations and operator interaction with the FACTS. 
As understanding of CFD environments matures, future work should address many of the 
elements discussed in this paper, such as the unique operational conditions created by a CFD 
environment, agent interactions, and creating security policies and procedures at both a 
system level integrated with existing security policies and at an operational device level to 
respond to failures and possible attacks that can occur in a CFD environment. This report 
provides an extended framework in which further work along these lines can be done. 
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11 Definitions 
Branch: Unless otherwise specified, a branch is an electric power line. 
Bus:  An electric power voltage bus, also called a node. 
CFD:  A Cooperating FACTS Device, that is, a FACTS device cooperating with other 
FACTS devices. A FACTS device is a CFD if and only if it is part of a group. 
Control system: The collection of devices used to monitor and control the power 
transmission network. May include, but is not limited to, the SCADA system 
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition), the Energy Management System 
(EMS), Automatic Generation Control (AGC), Remedial Action Schemes (RAS), 
telemetry media and devices, sensors, actuators and data storage devices. 
FACTS Flexible Alternating Current Transmission Systems 
Flow: Unless otherwise specified, the term flow refers to the amount of real power, 
usually expressed in watts, carried by a branch. The real power sent through the 
branch is proportional to the current flow in the branch. Flow is controlled by a 
FACTS device. 
Group:  FACTS devices cooperating with one another are a group. 
IGBT:  Insulated Gate Bipolar Transistor 
Long-term setpoints: Setpoints established by the cooperation of a group of CFDs 
Network:  Unless otherwise specified, the term network is used herein to mean an electric 
power transmission network, which encompasses the generation, transmission, 
distribution, and load devices (generators, lines, transformers, switches, 
capacitors, etc.) that generate, condition, transmit, and utilize electric power.  
Network state: For the purposes of this analysis, the network state is a set of flows, one for 
each operational branch of the network. The network state also incorporates the 
underlying network topology (connectivity), branch states (impedances), 
equipment states (in or out of service), and voltage, current and phase angles for 
system branches and nodes. 
Node:  An electric power voltage bus. 
Policy:  A network’s policy is the set of network conditions that the network’s managing 
and controlling entities are to achieve, the actions they are allowed to take in 
order to do so, and the conditions under which they may take those actions. 
Setpoint:  The value of a branch’s setpoint parameter is the appropriate amount of real and 
reactive power for that branch. A setpoint can be specified in several ways: (1) a 
power level not to be exceeded; (2) a power level from which branch power may 
not vary by more than some specified amount or percentage; (3) two values 
between which the power level is to be maintained; (4) voltage, impedance and 
phase angle. 
Sink:  An aggregate electric power load made up of individual residential, commercial 
and industrial loads. 
Source:  An electric power generating device. May refer to several such devices considered 
as a unit, such as a multi-generator oil or natural gas power plant. 
Vector: As with a disease, a vector of a contingency is a causal mechanism that triggers 
the consequence or failure. 
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